

JPRS 78188

29 May 1981

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1884

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

29 May 1981

EAST EUROPE REPORT

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1884

CONTENTS

BULGARIA

List of Foreign Delegations at 12th Bulgarian Communist Party Congress (RABOTNICHESKO DELO, 1 Apr 81)	1
Deputy Minister Urges Discipline in Military Duties (Mircho Asenov; ARMEYSKI KOMUNIST, No 4, 1981)	8
Better Planning, Organization of Military Exercises Urged (Lyubcho Toshkov; ARMEYSKI KOMUNIST, No 4, 1981)	14

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

SED Academician Gives Arguments for Separate GDR Nation (Walter Schmidt Interview; FREIE PRESSE, 3 Apr 81)	20
SED Stand Toward Church Seen Hardening (DER SPIEGEL, 4 May 81, NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, 5 May 81)...	25
Consequences of Polish Crisis Church in Service of State	
Cultural Legacy Analyzed in Context of General Education (Panos Terz; DAS HOCHSCHULWESEN, Mar 81)	31

POLAND

Solidarity Spokesman Reveals Behind Scenes Talks With Party (Martin Burcharth; INFORMATION, 10 Apr 81)	39
---	----

ROMANIA

Amended Decree on Border Guards Published (BULETINUL OFICIAL, 17 Apr 81)	47
---	----

YUGOSLAVIA

Briefs	
Dismissals in Podujevo	62
School Dismissals in Obilic	62
Istok Party Members Ousted	62

LIST OF FOREIGN DELEGATIONS AT 12TH BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS

Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 1 Apr 81 p 12

[List of foreign delegations attending the 12th BCP Congress. Phonetically spelled names of delegates are in parentheses.]

[Text] Communist Party of the Soviet Union, headed by Comrade Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, CC CPSU Politburo member and first secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee.

Communist Party of Vietnam, led by Army General Chu Huy Man, Central Committee Politburo member and head of the main political administration of the Vietnamese army.

SED, led by Comrade Kurt Hager, Politburo member and Central Committee secretary.

The Korean Workers' Party, led by Comrade Pak Song Chol, Central Committee Politburo member and vice-president of the DPRK.

Cuban Communist Party, led by Comrade Guillermo Garcia Frias, Central Committee Politburo members, vice-president of the state council and the Council of Ministers and minister of transportation of the Republic of Cuba.

Lao People's Revolutionary Party, led by Comrade Phoumi Vongvichit, member of the Central Committee Politburo and deputy prime minister and minister of education, sport and religion of the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, led by Nyamyn Jagbaral, Politburo member and Central Committee secretary.

PZPR, led by Comrade Tadeusz Grabski, Politburo member and Central Committee secretary.

Armenian Communist Party, led by Comrade Iosif Banc, member of the Political Executive Committee and Central Committee secretary.

MSZMP, led by Comrade Gyorgy Aczel, Central Committee Politburo member and deputy premier.

CPCZ, led by Alois Indra, Central Committee Presidium member and chairman of the CSSR Federal Assembly.

LCY, led by Comrade Svetozar Durotovich, executive secretary in the LCY Central Committee Presidium.

KNUFNS, led by Comrade Chea Sim, deputy chairman of the Front's Central Committee, deputy chairman of the National Revolutionary Council and minister of internal affairs of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

Australian Socialist Party, led by Comrade Trevor (McKandy), member of the party's Central Committee executive committee.

Austrian Communist Party, led by Comrade Karl (Reiter), Politburo member and Central Committee secretary.

Communist Party of Argentina, led by Comrade Rubens Iscaro, Central Committee Politburo member.

Bangladesh Communist Party, led by Comrade Abdus Salam, Central Committee secretary.

Belgian Communist Party, led by Comrade Jacques (Vitagues).

West Berlin SED, led by Comrade Harry (Pflichtbeil), Central Administration Bureau member.

Communist Party of Bolivia, led by Felipe Rodriguez.

Communist Party of Brazil, led by Comrade Givaldo Pereira de Sequeira, member of the Central Committee Political Commission.

Communist Party of Great Britain, led by Malcolm Pitt, member of the executive committee.

Communist Party of Venezuela, led by Comrade Pedro Ortega Diaz, member of the Politburo and the National Secretariat.

Communist Party of Guadeloupe, led by Comrade Henri Bangou, Central Committee Politburo member.

National-Progressive Party of Guyana, led by Comrade Janet Gagan, Central Committee secretary.

German Communist Party, led by Comrade Max (Schaeffer), Central Administration Presidium member.

Communist Party of Greece, led by Comrade Charilaos Florakis, Central Committee secretary general.

Danish Communist Party, led by Comrade Ib Norlund, Central Committee Politburo member.

Dominican Communist Party, led by Juan Persia, member of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee.

Communist Party of Egypt, led by Comrade Michel Kamal, member of the party Central Committee Politburo.

Communist Party of Ecuador, led by Comrade Jorge Isaac Sanchez.

Israeli Communist Party, led by Comrade Emil (Tuma), Central Committee Politburo member.

Indian Communist Party, led by Comrade Ch. K. Chandrapan, member of the Central Executive Committee of the National Council.

Communist Party of Iraq, led by Comrade (Naziha al Dileimi), Central Committee member.

Communist Party of Ireland, led by Comrade Ted Redmond, deputy national chairman.

Communist Party of Spain, led by Comrade Fernando Soto, member of the Central Committee Executive Committee.

Italian Communist Party, led by Comrade Mario Birardi, Central Committee secretary.

Communist Party of Jordan, led by Comrade Ishaq al-Hatib, Central Committee Politburo member.

Communist Party of Canada, led by Comrade Elizabeth Rowley, member of the Central Committee Executive Committee.

Progressive Party of the Cypriot Working People--AKEL, led by Comrade Yiannis Katsouridis, Central Committee Politburo member.

Communist Party of Colombia, led by Alvaro Vasquez, Politburo and Central Committee secretary member.

People's Vanguard of Costa Rica, led by Comrade Eduardo Mora Valverde, deputy secretary general.

Lebanese Communist Party, led by Comrade Niqua al-Shawi, chairman of the party.

Luxembourg Communist Party, led by Comrade Francois Hoffman, executive committee member.

Communist Party of Malta, led by Comrade Antoni (Vasalo), secretary general.

Moroccan Party of Progress and Socialism, led by Comrade Ali (Yata), secretary general.

Communist Party of Martinique, led by Comrade Silibert Dufael, Politburo member and Central Committee secretary.

Communist Party of Mexico, led by Comrade Lino Medina Salazar, central committee member

Nigerian Socialist Labor Party, led by Comrade Wahab (Goodluck), Politburo member and party deputy chairman.

Socialist Unity Party of New Zealand, led by Comrade George Jackson, national secretary.

Norwegian Communist Party, led by Comrade Arne Jorgensen, executive committee member and Central Committee secretary.

People's Party of Panama, led by Comrade (Cleto) Manuel Sousa, Politburo member and Central Committee secretary.

Communist Party of Peru, led by Comrade Alfredo Abarca, Central Committee Political Commission member.

Portuguese Communist Party, led by Comrade Joaquim Gomes, member of the Political Commission the Central Committee Secretariat.

Communist Party of El Salvador, led by Comrade Jorge Shafik Handal, Central Committee secretary general.

Communist Party of San Marino, led by Comrade Alberto Mino, member of the Directorate and the Central Committee Secretariat.

Communist Party of Syria, led by Comrade Zahayr (Abdul Samad), Central Committee Politburo member.

Communist Party of the Sudan, led by Comrade (Izedin Ali Amer), Central Committee member.

U.S. Communist Party, led by Comrade Sherlin Mitchell, member of the Political Committee of the Central Committee.

Communist Party of Turkey, led by Comrade Ismail Bilen, Central Committee secretary general.

Communist Party of Uruguay, led by Comrade Eduardo Viera, Central Committee Politburo member.

Communist Party of Finland, led by Comrade Marcus (Kaynulainen), Central Committee Politburo member.

French Communist Party, led by Comrade Madeleine Vincent, Central Committee Politburo member.

United Party of Haitian Communists, led by Comrade Jean Francois Bourjeoli, Central Committee member.

Communist Party of the Netherlands, led by Frederik Meis, Central Committee Politburo member.

Communist Party of Honduras, led by Comrade Victor Manuel Ramos, Central Committee member.

Communist Party of Chile, led by Comrade (Volodya Teytelboym), Central Committee Politburo member.

Swiss Labor Party, led by Comrade (Yakub Lekhlayter), Central Committee Politburo member.

Swedish Left Party--Communist, led by Comrade Lars Werner, party chairman.

Swedish Labor Party--Communist, led by Comrade Rolf Hagel, party chairman.

Communist Party of Sri Lanka, led by Comrade Sarath Muthetuwajama, Central Committee Politburo candidate member.

South African Communist Party, led by Comrade Moses Mabida, secretary general.

Labor Party of Jamaica, led by Comrade Rupert Lewis, Central Committee member.

Japanese Communist Party, led by Comrade Hitoshi (Sasaki), Central Committee member.

Delegation of the Editorial Collegium of the periodical PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA.

Indonesian Communist Party.

Paraguayan Communist Party.

Communist Party of Saudi Arabia.

African Party for the Independence of Senegal.

Tunisian Communist Party.

Communist Party of the Philippines.

Delegations of other communist and workers' parties.

Party of the National Liberation Front of Algeria, led by Comrade (Mustafa Benzaza), member of the Central Committee and the standing secretariat of the National Liberation Front National Committee.

MPLA--Angolan Labor Party, led by Comrade Juliao Mateus Paulo, Politburo member and Central Committee secretary, and Dino Matros.

People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, led by Comrade Saleh Ziray, Politburo member and Central Committee secretary, and member of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

National People's Party of Bangladesh, led by Comrade (Mohamad Ismail Khan), first deputy chairman of the party.

National Front for the Liberation of Bahrain.

Party of the National Revolution of Benin, led by Comrade (Marten Aconhiko), Central Committee Politburo member.

Party-State of Guinea, led by Comrade Galena Guilabogui, Central Committee member and minister of pre-university education.

African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC--Republic of Guinea-Bissau), led by Comrade Tiago Aleluia Lopes, member of the Executive Committee and secretary of the National Council of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau.

New Movement "Jewel" of Grenada, led by Comrade Unison Whiteman, Politburo member.

National-Progressive (Left) Party of Egypt, led by Comrade Mohamed Halil Halil, member of the General Secretariat.

Commission for the Organization of a Party of the Working People in Ethiopia, led by Comrade (Behranu Baye), member of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the COPTE, and member of the standing committee of the Provisional Military Administrative Council of Socialist Ethiopia.

United Party for National Independence (UNIP) of Zambia, led by Comrade Robin Camanga, Central Committee member and chairman of the political and juridical committee of the UNIP Central Committee.

African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, led by Comrade Sergio (Sentejo), National Council member.

Delegation of Republican Zimbabwe, led by Comrade Sydney Sekeramayi, member of the ZANU Central Committee and minister of lands, resettlement and rural development.

Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party of Iraq, led by Comrade 'Abd al-Fattah Muhammad Amin, member of the Revolutionary Command Council and the regional Ba'ath leadership.

Socialist Party of Yemen, led by Comrade Abdallah Ahmad al-Khamiri, Politburo candidate member and Central Committee secretary.

Congolese Labor Party, led by Comrade Florent Tsiba, Central Committee Politburo member.

General People's Congress of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, led by Comrade Mukhtar Ibrahim Qarba, member of the General Secretariat of the General People's Congress.

Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon, led by Comrade Tarek Shehab, deputy secretary general of the party.

Party of the Congress for the Independence of Madagascar, led by Comrade Richard Andriamnjato, national chairman.

Democratic Alliance of the People of Mali, led by Comrade (Talibe Sumare), Central Executive Bureau chairman.

FRELIMO Party, led by Jorge Rebelo, member of the standing political committee and Central Committee secretary.

Southwest Africa People's Organization--SWAPO--Namibia, led by Comrade David Meroro, national chairman.

Sandinista National Liberation Front--Nicaragua, led by Comrade Henry Ruiz Hernandez, national leadership member.

Palestine Liberation Organization, led by Majid abu Sharar, member of the executive committee.

Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe, led by Comrade Tome Costa, member of the movement's Coordination Council Politburo.

Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party--Syria, led by Comrade Muhammad Zuhayar Mashariqah, assistant secretary general of the regional party leadership.

Revolutionary Party of Tanzania, led by Comrade (Daudi Semquua), National Executive Committee member.

Movement for United People's Action--Workers and Peasants (Chile), led by Comrade Carlos Bau, Central Committee member.

African National Congress of South Africa, led by Comrade Alfred Nzo, secretary general.

Belgian Socialist Party, led by Jules van Dooren, leadership member.

Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, led by Comrade Julio Busqueto Bragulat, member of the International Relations Commission of the Catalan Socialist Party.

Chilean Socialist Party, led by Comrade Herman del Canto, Central Committee Politburo member.

Japanese Socialist Party, led by Comrade Masako Yamashita, Central Executive Committee member.

World Federation of Trade Unions, led by Comrade Jan Lemudri, federation secretary.

World Peace Council, led by Romesh Chandra, council president.

World Federation of Democratic Youth, led by Miklos Barabash, federation general secretary.

International Students' Union, led by Comrade Miroslav Stepan, union president.

5003

CSO: 2200

BULGARIA

DEPUTY MINISTER URGES DISCIPLINE IN MILITARY DUTIES

Sofia ARMEYSKI KOMUNIST in Bulgarian No 4, 1981 pp 18-23

[Article by Col Gen Mircho Asenov, deputy minister of national defense: "Exigency is an Important Prerequisite for Strengthening the Discipline"]

[Text] The major and responsible assignments set by the 12th BCP Congress cannot be implemented without improving the discipline in all sectors of public life. In the case of the Bulgarian People's Army, the strengthening of the discipline and raising it to a higher standard is determined by the military-technical revolution and the constant changes it makes in the field of armament and the ways and means of our struggle. Stricter requirements arise concerning the training, upbringing and moral-political resistance of the forces. Instruction and education tasks become more important and more complex.

The exigency of commanders and staffs is a major prerequisite for the strengthening of army discipline. It organically combines the work of the mind, will power and the emotional aspects of human spirituality. It requires not only a profound study and assessment of the actions of subordinates and expedient decision making but systematic and purposeful activities for the implementation of educational measures aimed at influencing the personnel to the greatest extent.

Such activities are the duty of the commander. He is entrusted with great rights and power and, together with the staff, he must firmly direct the life and combat activities of military personnel and firmly stop any deviations from regulations and legal documents. The commander must be strict and exigent. However, his exigency must be based on the Leninist principles of our management, high idea-mindedness and organizational scope. An order by the commander is a law for his subordinates, for he is acting in the name and the interest of the people.

Practical experience in training and combat convincingly proves that wherever slackness and lack of discipline exists there are inevitable shortcomings and omissions in the training progress and in overall army life. This can be prevented by exigency which is one of the features of the Leninist work style. It is a powerful lever which makes army life and activities thoroughly consistent with the requirements of military statutes and instructions, upgrades the effectiveness of the training-education process and maintains the troops in a state of highest combat readiness. The exigency of commanders requires not only the profound study and evaluation of the actions of subordinates and most expedient decision making, but

persistent, adamant and purposeful work for bringing educational objectives to a successful end. This can be achieved only when the commander proceeds in everything from the interests of the service and, guided by the statutory requirements, promotes in his subordinates an awareness of duty and dedicated service to the fatherland and the people. Exigency is not based on official authority alone but on the personal qualities and high standards and professional experience of commanders.

The nature of army service is such that it triggers by itself the need for command exigency. "Sensible exigency," A. S. Makarenko wrote, "is not only legitimate but necessary. It helps in the shaping of strong characters, developing a feeling of responsibility, training will power, promoting human dignity, and developing the ability to resist and surmount temptation."¹

The exigency of commanders and staffs in strengthening the discipline is fruitful when it is characterized by permanency and consistency. A commander becomes an oscillator when he demands his subordinates to carry out their obligations, when he does not fail to react to even the most minor deviations of regulations, restrictions and orders. Minor violations in the various circumstances of military service, such as tactical exercises, flight, navigation, use of equipment and armaments, guard duties, and so on, lead to serious violations of the discipline and to accidents, and lower the combat readiness of the armed forces. Commanders who are not persistent in demanding the observance of laws and the strict implementation of orders by their subordinates, and who themselves commit disciplinary violations, cannot achieve good results.

Intolerance of shortcomings and of negative phenomena in official activities is an important feature of exigency. Commanders who tolerate violations of rules by military personnel contribute themselves to the weakening of the discipline. Many examples could be cited of tolerant and even unprincipled behavior toward violators of discipline. Officer Todorov ignores many errors in training classes. He is not exigent toward his subordinates and does not demand of them to organize a high quality training process. This leads to many adverse consequences.

The commander's exigency is directly related to his awareness of duty and personal responsibility for impeccable performance of official duties and for steadily upgrading the responsibility of the collective and his subordinates. Commanders and staff frequently remain indifferent to substandard training conducted under simplified conditions. Thus, for example, many errors were made in the choice and occupation of a firing position in the course of tactical training with a crew in Officer Devedzhiev's subunit, and in the way Lieutenant Gerginov, the squad commander, gave the assignments. However, Officer Troynov did not interfere, showing a lowered feeling of duty and personal responsibility. On the other hand, the staff did nothing to assist him.

The commander's knowledge and general cultural standards and the good training of his staff are a major prerequisite for high exigency. Subordinates are strongly

1. A. S. Makarenko, "Soch." [Work], vol 5, Publishing House of the RSFSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, Moscow, p 399.

attracted to a commander who displays profound and comprehensive knowledge and who has highly trained officers serving on his staff. This is not a question of military knowledge exclusively. The modern commander and his staff officers must have a far broader outlook. Today more than 86 percent of our army's personnel have secondary, semi high and high education. These highly educated young people can be won over and led to the peak of combat skills by a commander who possesses the necessary culture and broad knowledge. During the training he not only shares the necessary knowledge with his subordinates but develops in them specific qualities, promotes a positive attitude toward the material studied, and encourages them to the accurate mastering and execution of official duties. His demand that regulations, orders and assignments be carried out has a strong influence on the troops, training them in a spirit of obedience and self-exigency.

The maintaining of high standards and coordination among all commanders and staffs in the assessment of facts and phenomena and, particularly, in relations with delinquents are of great importance. Frequently, however, along with strong-willed and exigent commanders, there are those who adopt a low standard in gauging violations and fail adequately to react to weaknesses in the training process, guard duties, or negative phenomena in the collective in the course of the preparation for and execution of the weekly cycle. Low criteria were applied in Officer Pavlov's unit. Here many weaknesses were allowed in training. Artillery fire practice was not held regularly and the exercises held were subjected to many conventions and simplifications. The unit's staff did not provide real leadership or show strictness concerning weaknesses in the training and education process. Many of the staff's officers spoke of exigency as being the most important condition for developing in the personnel a spirit of discipline, but in practice violated the strict requirements of the regulations, instructions and orders on subunit training and tolerated violations.

In some cases there are disparities between the exigency of commanders and their staff. Different approaches are allowed toward violations committed by privates, sergeants or officers. This worsens relations between commanders and subordinates and adversely affects the efforts to strengthen discipline. Identical exigency should be applied toward military personnel both on the part of the commander and of the staff.

The practice of some commanders to be rude instead of strict insults the dignity of subordinates and has rather adverse consequences. The liking for a superior officer is earned by the latter's behavior, comprehensive knowledge and personal example.

Practical experience indicates that tactlessness, curtness and rudeness are inherent in people whose training is poor, who have major educational gaps and whose possibilities are limited. Such commanders alienate themselves from their subordinates and are unable to properly carry out their responsible assignments. Conversely, exigency, combined with pedagogical tactfulness and culture, contributes to strengthening the discipline and developing good mutual relations in the army collectives. It predisposes the people to be frank, to be ready for self sacrifice and to be most obedient.

Rudeness and tactlessness begin where the commander, educator, political worker or staff officer forgets that he must be concerned with and pay attention to individuals.

The imposition of numerous and severe disciplinary punishments is no indicator of strict exigency. It is rather a characteristic of the lack of pedagogical skill. It proves helplessness and inability to develop an atmosphere of conscientious and initiative-minded implementation of assignments.

Equally wrong are commanders, particularly younger ones, who believe that higher discipline could be achieved through liberalism and "total forgiveness of sins." The troops value most commanders who are exigent and principle-minded, strict and fair. A commander who gives privileged status to some of his subordinates cannot enjoy proper authority, be liked or serve as an example. This kind of approach is felt by the collective and causes irreparable harm.

An exceptionally important feature of exigency is the commander's ability to work together with the political organs, to rely on party and Komsomol organizations, to standardize his approach with theirs, and to practice a party-based one-man command. The commander can influence his subordinates most easily by skillfully submitting problems to party and Komsomol organizations and when he is supported by the political organs and the party membership. It is through this method that he and his staff encourage the party members to become exemplary in the implementation of their military obligations, and unconditionally to obey orders, regulations and instructions.

It becomes very hard to develop conditions for high exigency in terms of strengthening military discipline when there is lack of unity in requirements formulated by commanders, staff, political organs, or party and Komsomol organizations. The commander must be able skillfully to formulate problems of exigency to a broad aktiv of party and Komsomol members, thus mobilizing the personnel for the solution of this exceptionally important problem. This is of tremendous importance in the proper functioning of overall army life based on the strict observance of regulations, instructions and orders.

Communist ideals serve as an inexhaustible source of spiritual strengths. However, they become a real power only after they have captured the imagination of the troops, encouraged their active efforts and turned into behavioral norms. This can be achieved faster if the commander, together with the party members and the entire party organization, works for the organic combination of the views and convictions of the troops with firm and fair exigency for the precise daily implementation of obligations by every military serviceman.

The attitude of the commander toward social activities in the unit is of educational importance. This applies to his attitude toward the party and Komsomol organizations, and the extent to which he participates in their work not only when problems of exigency but of other important aspects of life in the unit are considered.

The influence of the personal example is the result of the natural human tendency to emulate. In the case of the troops this is expressed in the steady repetition and duplication of many individual features of the commander's activities. As a

necessary element of constant exigency, habits and skills are developed and strengthened as a result of the multiple repetition of identical actions.

The way orders are issued is of great importance in promoting the educational role of the commander's exigency. A. S. Makarenko highly valued in the educator the ability to control his tone of voice and gestures. Soldiers react to the tone used in issuing instructions and orders. A punishment imposed with a sharp tone of voice is not received well by the subordinates. They begin to think that the commander is excessively strict because he is nervous and is displaying his bad mood. We must not forget that the troops' obedience is based on the awareness that they serve the party and the fatherland, but that they cannot tolerate an unfair attitude toward them.

The commander's orders must be brief and clear. This will create a willingness to carry them out precisely and unhesitatingly.

The political organs and party and Komsomol organizations can be of tremendous assistance to commanders and staff. They can contribute to the development of the type of psychological climate needed for creative, calm and efficient work. They can help the commanders to win over the heart of their subordinates with strict and fair exigency, paralleled by great humaneness and warmth.

Exigency is most durable and strong when it is combined with concern for subordinates. Many invisible channels and threads of social unity within our socialist society link commanders and staffs to their subordinates. The commander or the staff not only issues orders but educates, encourages and is concerned with subordinates, studies their needs, interests, feelings, thoughts and moods, and devotes systematic concern and efforts to ensuring their fullest satisfaction with everything they need for their living and training conditions. The political organs and party organizations are a great help to commanders and staff in such activities.

The political organs possess rich information concerning the moods and concerns of military personnel. The timely clarification to commanders and staff of problems affecting the troops helps rapidly to respond to just and legitimate demands and suggestions and to create a good psychological climate in units and military schools.

The commander's exactingness is most effective when it is related to specific and thorough control of execution. This is one of the most important duties of commanders, political organs and staffs.

The purpose and meaning of control of execution were clearly substantiated by V. I. Lenin: "To control the people and the actual implementation of assignments," he wrote, "is, again and again, the crux of the entire work, of the entire policy."¹

Control becomes effective only when it is permanent. It is effective and preventive when it is well planned, when tasks are formulated precisely and unequivocally, and when every participant is prepared to assume and does assume personal responsibility for the implementation of assignments.

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 45, p 16.

Exigency is developed like all other qualities of a commander. The process of its development must be considered in terms of dialectical unity with the development of the other qualities of the commander. It follows two directions: on the one hand, as the systematic and purposeful influence exerted by senior commanders and the party and Komsomol organizations; on the other, as a result of independent work through education and self-education. The harmonized influence of these two directions is particularly important.

One must be properly aware of the fact that the ability to display strict, firm yet fair exigency is not acquired easily. Past and present educators and psychologists have considered this problem. Its development requires a Marxist-Leninist outlook, extensive military and educational knowledge, high moral and military qualities and practical skills. It is achieved through dedicated efforts and personal example, respect for the collective, principle-mindedness and high party-mindedness in daily comprehensive work.

5203

CSO: 2200/81

BULGARIA

BETTER PLANNING, ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY EXERCISES URGED

Sofia ARMEYSKI KOMUNIST in Bulgarian No 4, 1981 pp 24-29

[Article by Maj Gen Lyubcho Toshkov: "Improving Command-organizational Work"]

[Text] Protection of the peaceful creative toil of the Bulgarian people and of the gains of our socialist homeland is the meaning and purpose of the activities of officer cadres in the Bulgarian People's Army. "The existence of the capitalist system and the uninterrupted attacks on the part of imperialist forces to oppose the building of socialism require the strengthening of the country's defense. Consequently....the combat readiness of the Bulgarian People's Army must be upgraded. ..."¹

The major and complex problems resolved by the troops at the present stage demand that even greater attention, responsibility and consistency be shown in improving command-organizing work of commanders, staffs and management and leadership organs at all levels.

"....Organizational work is the first and main direction in the activities of officers and party and Komsomol organizations in the implementation of the tasks set by the party and the government to our armed forces,"² Army General D. Dzheurov, BCP Central Committee Politburo member and minister of national defense, emphasizes.

Military affairs are developing dynamically and the armed forces face ever new and more important assignments. The type of training, knowledge and experience considered adequate yesterday are inadequate today. As V. I. Lenin taught us, "The essence of the matter lies in not being satisfied with the skills we have developed through past experience, but steadily to go on, to try to achieve mandatorily more, and mandatorily to advance from easier to more difficult tasks. No progress at all is possible without this, including progress in the building of socialism."³

Life calls for the systematic study of new developments in the art of operations, tactics and armaments, and for steady improvements in work styles and methods, cadre training and the development of cadre initiative and creativity.

In accordance with these requirements, active efforts are being made in the units to make the activities of the subjective factor entirely consistent with existing objective conditions. In most areas the necessary environment has been created to provide conditions enabling every member of an army collective to carry out his

official duties fruitfully, on time and completely. Commanders, staffs, political organs and party and Komsomol organizations accurately realize that for the normal functioning of the army organism as a single, complex and dynamic system, not only individual units within it but all its elements must act with full synchronisation and accuracy. The nonfulfillment or shifting of obligations not only hinders the work of the system as a whole but, willy nilly, counters the party's slogan of high effectiveness and high quality and leads to adverse ideological consequences.

The stipulations of the 12th BCP Congress and the report sent by Comrade T. Zhivkov to the TCP Central Committee Politburo calling for activeness, initiative, creativity, persistence and exceptionally high exigency toward cadres in the implementation of any task apply largely to the armed forces as well. Yet these are, above all, problems of command-organizational work.

Command-organizational work is a complex system. It includes the profound study and interpretation of each assigned task from the viewpoint of party requirements; planning the necessary work for the implementation of assignments; organization of the practical implementation of assignments and planned measures; control of execution; and assessment of plan implementation results.

The present article will consider a few of the most topical problems of improving command-organizational work by commanders and staffs.

In our army the planning system is centralized. It is based on democratic centralism and on the principle of one-man command. It is correct and has been tried and tested in practice. At the present stage of our work, however, and particularly after Comrade T. Zhivkov's report to the BCP Central Committee Politburo and the materials of the 12th BCP Congress, we must continue our efforts for the further improvement of the planning system as the central feature of management.

The assessment of the work of commanders and staffs, on the basis of party documents, reveals that planning has not as yet become a base for the fuller implementation of the requirements of the political, economic and comprehensive approach which must be used in our all-round political and organizational work. We must gain a better mastery of and apply more successfully the program-target approach in the planning of combat and political training. Targets and assignments must be made more concrete and scientifically substantiated.

The formulation of a clear objective and the accurate determination of basic tasks and the realistic assessment of the forces and possibilities of commanders, staffs, political organs and army collectives, the anticipation and consideration of likely difficulties which may arise in carrying out planned measures and the profound consideration of political and material support measures are the basic requirements of scientific planning.

In this respect considerable results have been achieved in the unit of Officers Yankov and Setirov. The command and the staffs are trying to take these requirements into consideration and make the fullest possible use of all objective possibilities existing in the subunits for attaining high combat and political training results. Good purposefulness, long range planning and comprehensiveness has been achieved. Prerequisites have been created for the implementation of the plan at all

levels, from the staff to the individual units. The immediate plan assignments are explained promptly. The requirements stipulated in the report submitted by Comrade Orisha Filipov who addressed the 29 July 1980 BCP Central Committee Plenum are being observed: everyone must know what is to be done and within what deadline and what part of the plan's implementation depends on him; every manager must rapidly and operatively resolve arising problems; every party member must give the example and those whose behavior does not help to implement assignments must be taken to task.

We must upgrade the standard of planning optimality and quality. Some commanders, staff and political organs are still drafting insufficiently optimized plans. Two deviations are allowed to occur: in some of them we note a trend toward maximalism; in others a reduced number of measures are planned for. In those cases, a certain amount of formalism is allowed and the planning principle is underestimated. We consider optimal a plan which ensures to the highest extent the implementation of all assignments facing the subunits. The principal yardstick the National Party Conference pointed out, the quality criterion of the plan, is its coordination and comprehensive support. This is a prerequisite for its 100 percent implementation.

The organization of the practical implementation of tasks and planned measures must become the core of all command-organizational work.

Any planning would be unrealistic if measures are not carried out promptly and properly, on the basis of a stricter criterion used in the determination of results.

Presently the practical work of commanders and staffs must be shifted downward to subordinate units and commanders must be assisted in properly organizing the implementation of daily, weekly and monthly tasks. The weekly schedule and the monthly plan must be treated as inviolable laws.

Improvements in command-organizational work assume the direct participation of commanders and staff officers in efforts to raise the standards of organization and working conditions in the armed forces. The personal participation of commanders and staff officers in the development of a single rhythm, model order, high level organization, efficiency and fullest possible utilization of the working time for resolving the immediate problems related to combat readiness, training and education of the personnel are high level manifestations of organization and responsibility to the party and the people.

The task of training junior officers and ensuring their overall growth must be a permanent feature of the command-organizational work of commanders and staffs. Many commanders and political workers such as Officers Lenkov, Perchekliyaki, Tsankov, Tavetin, R. Petkov and others, are skillfully sharing their knowledge, skills and practical and military experience with the young generation. They are studying, popularizing and applying the rich experience of the Soviet armed forces. They allocate time and effort for individual work with young officers. They devote systematic concern for the latter's ideological training, mental firmness and professional training and the improvement of methodical skills. They pay particular attention to command-organizational and political work.

This meets the party stipulation of training true leaders--independent, daring, initiative-minded, principle-minded, responsible, and able to organize, to rally and to lead collectives in the struggle for the successful implementation of each separate task. These are people, as Comrade T. Zhivkov emphasized, "...possessing knowledge and experience, a creative mind and a warm heart, people who can properly assess and daringly take risks related to innovative decisions and actions."⁴

At the present stage, the effectiveness of command-organizational work greatly depends on the way commanders and staffs use control over the implementation of assignments with a view to acquiring a better knowledge of the organization of measures related to combat and political training, ensuring prompt control and aid, and quickly reacting to weaknesses in the training process or the discipline. "To control," army Gen Dobri Dzhurov, BCP Central Committee Politburo member and minister of national defense, points out, "means, today, to organize."⁵

We have frequently come across the substandard implementation of some planned measures. Some commanders and staffs have still not developed a clear feeling for live organizing work. Elements of general-purpose bookish-bureaucratic management have been noted. Aid and control are not always preventive, sufficiently profound or complete. Sometimes shortcomings are noted but no timely or decisive measures are taken for their prompt elimination or nipping in the bud.

Despite the efforts of most commanders, staffs and political organs, the necessary exigency and intolerance of organizational weaknesses and shortcomings are still not being displayed. Low criteria are still being maintained in some areas. Complacency and insufficient responsibility exist. Control is not used as one of the basic means for making activities of subordinate commanders and staffs consistent with regulations and objective conditions.

The style of individuals and their ability to organize army life in accordance with regulations, orders and instructions, has not developed as a main problem and target of investigation. Not all leading organs and units carry out systematic, continuing and all-embracing control activities. That is why not all decisions or planned measures are carried out actively and the reason that no unity between words and actions is achieved. Other requirements of control of execution are violated as well: frequently control is superficial and substandard. Control problems and the choice of personnel and time of control are not planned with sufficient thoroughness. Occasionally the objectives of control are twisted and instead of giving specific assistance to those controlled only weaknesses and errors are sought.

We must develop a style and method of work and leadership which will enable each official or party organ to make use of its entire rights and obligations and of all available ways and means for the implementation of planned measures and assignments.

The study, popularization and application of leading experience have a considerable impact on the improvement of command-organizational work. "The achievements of frontranking labor collectives and the experience of frontrankers," the BCP Central Committee Politburo decision on the mass socialist competition in honor of the 12th BCP Congress points out, "must quickly become the target and standard of every party and Komsomol member, every worker and labor collective."

The study, popularization and application of frontranking experience are adequately practiced in the command-organizational work of commanders and political workers of the units of Officers Kozanov and Tsankov. This is also one of the decisive prerequisites which enabled the units to reach leading positions in the socialist competition last year. In these units the possibilities of the personnel of mastering military affairs and achieving the highest possible result in training and education are assessed profoundly. At each stage in the training of subunits results are analyzed promptly and aid is given to those who have fallen behind. The experience of frontrankers in the various disciplines is discussed at conferences and commander and instructor-methodical training classes. Extensive use is also being made of the united politics days in the course of which experienced commanders and political workers share their experience in terms of organization, training and accountability of the socialist competition. This makes it possible for positive and new aspects to reach the subunits and individual soldiers. Training exercises are highly intensive and well organized, involving the entire personnel. This, in turn, is a guarantee for consolidating achievements and reaching even higher results in honor of the 12th BCP Congress, the 25th anniversary of the April Plenum, the 90th anniversary of the founding of the BCP and the 1300th anniversary of the founding of the Bulgarian state.

Discipline is a key problem which affects to a decisive extent the improvement of command-organizational work. It has been frequently raised by the party's central committee. At present, however, it assumes special significance. The report submitted by Comrade T. Zhivkov to the BCP Central Committee Politburo and the materials of the 12th BCP Congress raise particularly sharply the problem of planning, financial, labor and technological discipline. Exceptionally strict requirements concerning the organization of labor activities and discipline, in the broadest meaning of the term, have been formulated with full justification.

The stipulations and requirements of these important documents are being manifested in army life to an increasing extent. The majority of commanders and political workers are influencing army collectives ever more successfully with their intolerance of shortcomings, high feeling of responsibility and daily concern for subordinates. Exigency and responsibility for the fulfillment of their tasks has become their work style and method. This creates real prerequisites for the personnel to reveal its possibilities and capabilities in mastering military affairs and upgrading the level of combat and political training.

Nevertheless, problems of disciplines are not resolved successfully everywhere in our command-organizational work.. Some commanders and political workers are too slow in reorganizing their work, preventive work in particular. They do not always take to task those who do not fulfill their official obligations conscientiously, fail to set an example or violate the discipline. The type of socio-psychological climate which can actively contribute to the quality of command-organizational work has not been created everywhere.

Discipline must imbue every single element of organizational work. We must make an even deeper political analysis of the slightest disciplinary violation, regardless of its perpetrator. We must put a firm end to liberalism, tolerance and reduced feelings of responsibility. In turn, this will considerably improve command-organizational work in the struggle for high results in combat and political training and in raising the level of combat readiness of units and large units.

The theory and practice of command-organizational work in the Bulgarian People's Army have been enriched by the ideas of the 12th BCP Congress. At the same time, the decisions adopted at the congress raised new and even stricter requirements. We must undertake the profound study and prompt application of these decisions in our activities with a view to comprehensively upgrading the political vigilance of commanders, staffs and political organs in the face of aggressive encroachments and the mad arms race launched by imperialist NATO members and, particularly, the United States.

As in the past, we must promote the fruitfulness of overall command-organizational work mainly through the practical results achieved in the training and educational process, improved concern for the material and spiritual needs of the personnel, strengthening of the discipline and the political-moral status and, in the final account, the readiness to carry out any assignments set by the BCP Central Committee and the people's government in the defense of our socialist homeland and the world's socialist comity.

FOOTNOTES

1. Theses of the 12th BCP Congress (draft). RABOTNICHESKO DELO, 16 Feb 1981.
2. D. Dzheurov, "Komandirat--Organizator i Vuzpitatel" [The Commander--Organizer and Educator]. Sofia, 1974, p.121.
3. V. I. Lenin, "Such." [Works] Vol 28, p 191.
4. T. Zhivkov, "Za Usuvurshenstvuvane na Sotsialisticheskata Organizatsiya na Truda i na Planovoto Rukovodstvo na Ikonomikata" [On the Improvement of the Socialist Organization of Labor and Planned Management of the Economy]. Sofia, 1978, p 52.
5. D. Dzheurov, "The Army Party Members are Always in their Combat Posts," NARODNA ARMIYA, 12 Mar 1981.

5003

CSO: 2200/81

SED ACADEMICIAN GIVES ARGUMENTS FOR SEPARATE GDR NATION

Karl-Marx-Stadt FREIE PRESSE in German 3 Apr 81 'Heute fuer Morgen' Supplement
p 6

[Interview with Prof Dr Walter Schmidt, director, Institute for German Workers Movement History, Academy of Social Sciences, SED Central Committee by Joachim Werner, FREIE PRESSE editorial board: "Why in the GDR the Socialist German Nation Is an Inevitable Development." For a number of references to items of related information see translations of articles by this author and others, published under quoted headings in the following JPRS issues of this series: "Nation Versus Nationality Concept Analyzed," 74590, 16 Nov 79, No 1738, pp 44-53; "West German Reviews of GDR's Two Nations-Two Languages Problem," 76703, 27 Oct 80, No 1821, pp 23-44; and "West German Analysis: GDR's Two Nations-Two Languages Concept Debated," 74674, 29 Nov 79, No 1742, pp 23-31]

[Text] Biographic Data

Walter Schmidt was born in 1930 in Weide near Breslau (Wroclaw) as the son of a worker's family. After attending elementary and high school, he received his high school diploma and then studied history, Slavic languages and culture and pedagogics in Jena from 1949 to 1953.

From 1953 on, Walter Schmidt worked as assistant and instructor at the Institute for German Workers Movement History where, since 1964, he has worked as director and holds an academic chair.

Schmidt was made a professor in 1965. He worked, among other things, as FDJ functionary at the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena. In 1950, he became an SED candidate and joined the party in 1952. He held the position of party secretary and was a regular member of the party leadership at the institute.

In his publications, Prof Dr Schmidt deals especially with the history of the revolutionary German labor movement in the 19th century, Marx-Engels research, with problems of historical methodology and the history of the nation.

Prof Dr Walter Schmidt is vice-president of the GDR Historians Society. He has received, among other things, the GDR National Award and the Fatherland's Medal of Merit in Silver.

Walter Schmidt is married and has one son.

Introduction

In more than 3 decades, important revolutionary changes have taken place in the social life of the GDR. Beginning with the antifascist-democratic revolution after World War II, this development led, with the building of a socialist society, to the formation of a socialist German nation which, a few days before the 10th SED Party Congress, is proving its vitality in many different ways. Politicians and ideologists of FRG imperialism oppose this historical reality by defending the thesis that, in spite of the fact that political, governmental and social conditions are contrary to each other in principle in the GDR and FRG, there still exists a unified German nation and that therefore there is still an "open German question." But this is contrary to the truth. The "Topics of Our Time" page of today's edition will therefore deal with problems of the role of the nation.

[Question] Professor Schmidt, since when have nations actually existed?

[Answer] In the history of mankind nations have not always existed. They developed only after the growth of capitalist societies on the basis of economic, sociopolitical and ideological processes. In conjunction with such ethnic factors as language, customs and life-styles, which had developed over previous centuries, these processes then led to the unification of larger population groups in new social units, i.e. nations.

[Question] How did this development take place on German soil?

[Answer] The German nation evolved as an "organized nation in the capitalist sense" (Marx) from a long historical process. This process began at the turn of the 15th to the 16th century with the growth of capitalist production conditions and with the early middle-class revolutions between 1517 and 1526. The formation of the capitalist German nation was pushed forward by the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1848/49 and came to its conclusion with the formation of the "German Reich" in 1870/71.

There Is No Nation Per Se

[Question] You are talking about a capitalist German nation. There is, then, no nation per se?

[Answer] No, there is no nation per se. Decisive for the development and substance of a nation are always its social class-oriented components which are then combined with ethnic factors to a new unit.

[Question] Does that mean, then, that all that talk in Bonn about the continuation of a unified German nation is in principle senseless?

[Answer] The FRG doctrine of the continued existence of a unified German nation is, just like the thesis of the continued existence of the "German Reich within the borders of 1937," a provocative affrontery with vindictive aims. Contrary to historical realities, this thesis is supposed to uphold the alleged legal claim of German imperialism to the GDR with the one goal of liquidating socialism and turning back the wheels of history.

[Question] What ideas form the basis of this insinuation?

[Answer] There are several possible interpretations. Those who support the thesis of a unified German nation proceed from an idealistic nation concept in which the term "nation" is separated from its social and class-oriented foundations. The concept of "nation" is reduced to elements of consciousness, to ethnic characteristics. But this is contrary to historical truth. Those supporting the thesis often say that all of us are Germans, and cite as proof our common language, customs, life-style and culture. But there are other countries, like Switzerland and Austria, where German is spoken. But on the basis of a different socioeconomic and political development these countries have followed their own historical course and developed into independent capitalist nations. This shows that common ethnic characteristics do not result in the formation of a nation.

Expression Of a Historical Movement

[Question] What right do we have to speak of the development of a socialist German nation?

[Answer] The historical reality that the socialist German nation is in the process of being formed was mentioned for the first time at the Eighth SED Congress, and the historical fact was unequivocally stated in the party program approved by the Ninth SED Congress. This was no arbitrary statement, as bourgeois politicians claim, but rather it emphasized a real historical movement that has taken place for 3 and 1/2 decades according to the historical norms of our time. With its development toward socialism, the GDR is also gradually changing into a socialist nation. The foundations for this development were laid by the political power of the working class and the creation of socialist production conditions.

[Question] What factors characterize the development of the socialist German nation at the present time?

[Answer] First, I want to say that this is a continuous process which prevades all social strata. In the present phase, the economic, social, political and spiritual foundations of the new socialist nation will be further strengthened and

the 10th SED Congress will outline the next tasks. Second, the interrelationship between socialism and the ethnic characteristics of the German people will be further developed, as demanded by constantly changing social conditions. And third, the development of a socialist national consciousness in the GDR will be increasingly emphasized.

[Question] How is this consciousness expressed?

[Answer] It is expressed especially in the fact that the citizens of the republic identify increasingly with their state. They are proud of what has been accomplished, of what they themselves have created. They want to be responsible for their country and are ready to protect their achievements. This is expressed in these current weeks through many competitive initiatives in preparation for the party congress. The citizens of the GDR are also conscious of the fact that we are not alone but rather a firm component of the socialist community of nations. Here, socialist patriotism and socialist internationalism are combined into an organic unity. Each citizen of the GDR is not only a citizen of our republic but also an active coworker in the entire socialist world.

Good Traditions Are Fostered and Further Developed

[Question] Socialist national consciousness has therefore nothing in common with nationalism?

[Answer] Nationalism is in principle alien to socialism. Our politically and ideologically oriented education toward nationalism is directed toward the unity of patriotic and international education and formation. This does not exclude the fact that every now and then man's thinking overemphasizes one or the other side of national characteristics, especially under the influence of the "exaggerated German-consciousness" coming from the FRG. However, it is characteristic for our society that our people are developing a socialist national consciousness related to the GDR which is proving to be an active element in the formation of the already developed socialist society. It is of decisive importance in this regard that our citizens see themselves as active builders of a socialist nation.

[Question] But ethnic characteristics and historical traditions play an important role in our country, too?

[Answer] Naturally. In the development of a socialist nation in the GDR, all good and worthwhile characteristics of the German people are included, such as hard work, orderliness and discipline. Their combination with socialism especially, their encouragement and further development under the new social conditions is an important aspect of our national progress. At the same time, new customs are developing. I want to call to mind at this point only such working class customs as Youth Dedication and Children's Day, which have already taken firm roots in the life of the GDR population. Whatever the great German humanists, poets and philosophers left us as an inheritance finds its appropriate continuation, care and continued development in the socialist German state.

In the GDR All Nationalities Have Equal Rights

[Question] Occasionally, questions arise about the exact relationship between nation and nationality. Would you please give us a few thoughts on this topic?

[Answer] As I have already stated, the nation includes those economic, political, social and ideological relationships which are class-oriented, in dialectic unity with ethnic ties which in most cases operate above a number of social patterns. Nationality, on the other hand, is defined as the totality of ethnic qualities, characteristics and relationships of an individual population and the classes and groups belonging to it. German nationality developed a long time before the formation of the capitalist [German] nation.

[Question] But do not bourgeois ideologists like to equate nation and nationality?

[Answer] This is done primarily in order to deny the basic contrast between the two German states. Common language, origin and customs are often mentioned in order to create confusion in questions of nation and nationality. We remain firm in our concept of historical reality: according to its sociohistorical image, the GDR as a nation is socialist and as a nationality German. The FRG, according to its sociohistorical image, is as a nation capitalist and as a nationality likewise German. Having the same nationality does not mean belonging to the same nation, and has absolutely nothing to do with having the same citizenship. Behind the confusion about the essential differences between nation and national state on the one hand, and nationality on the other is Bonn's affrontery not to recognize citizenship of the socialist GDR and to submit GDR citizens to the jurisdiction of the FRG.

[Question] Are all GDR citizens of German nationality?

[Answer] The majority of our citizens are of German nationality, according to origin, language, customs and traditions, and also according to ethnic characteristics. The socialist nation in the GDR is of German nationality. At the same time, we have in our country citizens of another, namely the Sorbian, nationality. All of these citizens have equal rights in participating in the further development of the socialist GDR.

8889

CSO: 2300/198

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

SED STAND TOWARD CHURCH SEEN HARDENING

Consequences of Polish Crisis

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German Vol 35 No 19, 4 May 81 pp 62, 63, 66

[Unattributed article: "GDR/Church: Profound Mistrust"]

[Text] Protestants in the GDR are beginning to feel the consequences of the Polish crisis: The SED is making life more difficult for the churches.

The future bishop did not really feel like rejoicing. When the 124 delegates to the Berlin-Brandenburg synod elected him as their new head, Gottfried Porck said in some dismay: "I would much rather have stayed where I was."

The delegates in East Berlin's Stephanus convent couldn't really blame the 57 year-old Cottbus superintendent because in succeeding 69 year-old Albrecht Schoenherr who will retire in September, Porck is taking over the reins at a most difficult time for the Protestants of the GDR.

After a fairly lengthy spring, the SED has permitted its relationship to the church to cool off considerably after the Polish summer of 1980. The SED censored news items in church publications, refused to let Western journalists cover church synods, put a ban on travel to the West by GDR theologians--imposing restrictions which were thought to be a thing of the past in view of the understanding reached between SED chief Erich Honecker and Schoenherr on 6 March 1978.

On that occasion, the head atheist ("We are showing a great deal of understanding and will adhere to it.") made far-reaching concessions to the chairman of the associated churches of the GDR, such as giving access to state television to both churches for the first time.

The reasons for the "ups and downs in state-church relations," as the Berlin-Brandenburg church leadership delicately describes present SED policy, are plain enough: in view of the Polish events, the SED is afraid that the Evangelical church could become a similar kind of rallying point in the GDR.

Just how profound the mistrust really is the churchmen could tell last November. When the Protestants wanted to have all churchbells ring on Repentance Day to close out a 10-day drive for disarmament and peace, the GDR government would have none of it.

The ringing of the bells would have coincided with a nationwide test of air raid sirens. In Poland it was this very combination by which the general strike was initiated. The GDR authorities were also disturbed by public criticism on the part of the church. It had protested last year against the increase of minimum exchanges; against travel restrictions between the GDR and Poland, and against the extensive media coverage of military maneuvers.

When the "Evangelical News Service in the GDR" (Ena) attempted to pass the protest to the SED media, state censorship ordered the pertinent passages deleted. The government also told the bishops and priests to hold back on political statements in the future. "We were given to understand," said Schoenherr, "that there were limits to what the church could say that could not, for the time being at least, be overstepped."

In routine conversations with SED functionaries, churchmen received much the same message. Prior to Poland, controversial topics could be talked about in small groups; but these are now taboo. At its synod late last year, the Greifswald regional church complained that "it is no longer possible" to discuss "the difficulties arising from the minimum exchange regulations with state representatives at the central level."

The party leaders are suspicious above all of the churchmen's contacts to the West. A GDR theologian says that Politburo member Paul Verner, responsible for security and church affairs told Schoenherr "in no uncertain terms" that the "all-German machinations" must stop. Among other things, the SED leadership was displeased by a meeting between chancellor Helmut Schmidt and bishop Schoenherr last year.

Especially in the field of education, always an area of conflict between the church and the Communists, there is nothing much going on at present. Ever since the GDR issued its new school regulations in 1979 which called for "improving communist education among high school students," the church has been trying to get the SED to commit itself to non-discrimination on religious grounds.

After 1978, to be sure, there were more Protestant students than ever before admitted to high school graduating classes and to the universities; but there still are restrictions. The Berlin-Brandenburg regional church, for example, at its synod two weeks ago pointed out that there had indeed been more Christian students admitted to the expanded high school but that the church was successful in fighting refusals only in exceptional cases.

The authorities are equally adamant about the 9th and 10th form military affairs courses introduced in 1978. Although the SED leadership promised not to discriminate against students who did not attend these courses, local functionaries have applied pressure on students who stay away.

The SED only shows a readiness to cooperate whenever their good reputation abroad is at stake: For the World Council of Churches meeting in Dresden next August, the city's hygiene museum will be turned into a press center and a state-run Interhotel will be made available to the visiting delegates.

As long as the situation in Poland remains critical the Evangelicals are not counting on their own situation to improve. The government will not talk to the church wherever and whenever it fears that the church is posing a threat to its power was the conclusion reached by the Greifswald regional church recently.

Nonetheless, the bishops will continue trying to reach an understanding with the government and to maintain the "church under socialism" policy instituted by Schoenherr. They are basing this on the SED's promise to adhere, in the words of the state secretary for church affairs, Klaus Gysi, to a "constructive and sympathetic position with regard to the interests of the church."

The selection of the Cottbus theologian Porck as the new bishop for Berlin-Brandenburg is a clear indication of this. Prior to his appointment, Porck explicitly came out in favor of his predecessor's policy.

The Protestants have no intention of keeping silent in the future. "We have a distinct opposite number," Porck said later, "who forces us to make clear statements."

Church in Service of State

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 5 May 81 p4

[Article signed 'sy,' datelined Berlin, 3 May: "New Developments In GDR Churches' Relations With State"]

[Text] Rededication of Nikolai Church

The rededication of the Nikolai Church in Potsdam this weekend marked a high point in the work of the evangelical churches in the GDR. The more than 140 year-old church built by the Berlin architect Schinkel which was heavily damaged in World War II now is one of the landmarks of the former Prussian capital and present-day GDR regional capital southwest of Berlin. Not only government representatives but also representatives of the regional evangelical churches of West Germany had come for the celebration. The latter contributed much of the funds needed to reconstruct the church. The impressive structure in the heart of Potsdam's inner city is not only a reflection of the recognition accorded by the GDR for some years now to the "national cultural heritage;" the reconstruction of the church which is to serve three parishes can also be viewed as an expression of the sense of self and the self-assurance of a church existing under "real socialism." In the GDR, just about half of the 17 million inhabitants still profess the Christian faith--a minority belonging to the Roman Catholic church.

More Latitude and More Chicanery

Over the past few months there has been a new development in the contest between church and state in the GDR. At the recent 10th party congress, to be sure, party general secretary Honecker reiterated his intention of continuing to adhere to his "tried-and-true" church policy; but there are more than enough indications for the fact that the policy of limited cooperation and modest concessions by the state has taken a new turn.

At a meeting with the presidium of the evangelical churches in the GDR in March 1978, Honecker had, in his words "laid the foundation for the continuing development of businesslike, constitutionally just and sympathetic relations." It is likely that the SED was guided by the consideration that the political realities in the GDR made it unnecessary to persist in continuing to combat a church that was losing both its prestige and its membership. They thought it a better idea to place the existing Christian inclination toward commitment in the service of the socialist state. As a consequence, the state reaffirmed the right of the evangelical churches to engage in charitable activities and even granted them the right --that had to be viewed as a concession-- of airing occasional religious radio broadcasts. In addition, the state

even permitted limited pastoral care for prisoners. But well-ordered relations ran into difficulties wherever church activities cast doubt on the state's political power base. Thus, church criticism against the institution of obligatory military affairs courses for students of general studies schools was unavailing. There were repeated complaints as well against the discrimination of young people in vocational training simply because they adhered to their Christian beliefs.

Last fall --no doubt because of its anxiety about events in Poland-- the SED gave some initial indications of a change of course in church policy. In conjunction with moves aimed at tightening border controls by raising the mandatory money exchange quotas for Western visitors and by largely curtailing free travel between the GDR and Poland, the party opposed church efforts on disarmament so as not to let the undesired impression arise that the GDR churches and those of the FRG were acting in concert. The party prevented reports of such activities from appearing in GDR church publications which have low circulations as it is. Leading churchmen were not permitted to travel to the West to attend an evangelical church synod there. Western correspondents were not allowed to cover regional church synods for the first time. Last month, the GDR foreign ministry even called in some West German correspondents regularly accredited in East Berlin for having covered the Berlin-Brandenburg regional synod without applying for special permission.

That was the synod at which Gottfried Forck was elected the new evangelical bishop for East Berlin. The present incumbent, Schoenherr, is due to retire soon. Schoenherr also heads the associated evangelical churches of the GDR-- a post, however, which Forck is unlikely to seek. Like Schoenherr, 57 year-old Forck is viewed as supporting a coordinated dialogue with the government. To be sure, he owes his election on the second ballot in preference to Demke, a theologian and church administrator, to the fact that the synod appears to have leaned toward the selection to a church figure experienced in parish work. Until now, Forck held the post of general superintendent of a church district in the provinces.

Official Policy Doubted

This is not to say that the election of a parish worker is necessarily indicative of church criticism of all-too-obliging cooperation with the atheistic state. After all, this particular attitude on the part of church officials is viewed with some misgivings, most of all among young and committed Christians. It stands to reason

that the official church has not been commenting on the stiffening of government policy; but there are indications that an overall about-face from the government policy initiated in 1978 is not expected. But there is no doubt that conditions for the existence of the church in the GDR are once more beginning to change as a result of this stiffening SED policy.

9478

CSO: 2300/216

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

CULTURAL LEGACY ANALYZED IN CONTEXT OF GENERAL EDUCATION

East Berlin DAS HOCHSCHULWESEN in German Vol 29 No 3, Mar 81 signed to press
14 Jan 81 pp 74-77

[Article by Dr Panos Terz, lecturer, deputy director, Institute for International Studies, Karl Marx University, Leipzig: "General Education, Heritage Problem and Scientific Work." Translated excerpts from Kurt Hager's speech cited below are published as part of a report on the GDR's Fifth Conference on Higher Education, which opened in East Berlin on 4 September 1980, under the heading, "Honecker Opens Berlin Higher Education Conference," in FBIS Eastern Europe DAILY REPORT, Vol II, No 177, 10 September 1980, pp E 4-E 11. For additional references to items of related information see translation of March 1980 East Berlin EINHEIT article by Prof Horst Bartel, published in JPRS 77973, 30 Apr 81, No 1875 of this series, pp 12-24]

[Text] The tasks in higher education for the years ahead, as formulated in the 18 March 1980 SED Central Committee Politburo resolution and at the Fifth Conference on Higher Education, obligates the scientists, and especially the teachers in higher education, to look for broader intellectual horizons and orient themselves to still greater dimensions in their scientific work, i.e., mainly in research. Prerequisite to it is further elevating the level of general education of the scientists working in higher education and of the students. This precisely was the aspect addressed by Comrade Kurt Hager in his speech at the Fifth Conference on Higher Education, saying: "Should there not be lecture courses accessible to students in all departments on important scientists from Archimedes to Einstein, on the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant and Hegel, Feuerbach and Bertrand Russell, on the poetic works of Homer and Dante, Shakespeare and Schiller, Fontane and Brecht, on expressionism and naturalism and other values of science, philosophy and art in the past and present?"¹

This question implies some essential problems in our higher education with regard to the aspect of general education, the attitude toward the knowledge of previous generations and other peoples, and the reception of our legacy. It furthermore expresses indirectly that our higher education institutions greatly have to catch up in this regard.

The briefly sketched problem situation indicated by what has here been said became an occasion for us to think about the promotion of general education as a politically

always topical and interesting and, in terms of the humanities, demanding set of problems. They are based, of course, on the real needs of socialist society and, especially, those of our system of socialist higher education. Furthermore, certain requirements have to be taken account of which have to do with the exacerbation of the ideological struggle between socialism and imperialism. Proceeding from these general premises, the present contribution aims at calling attention to selected aspects of these problems facing us and at offering some suggestions for further considerations.

On the Nature of General Education

General education has always had to do with the ideal of the universal and harmonious development of personality as it has motivated men for centuries.² That is true, e.g., of the classical Greek concept of *kalokagathia*--the *kalokagathos* being "the educated man uniting in himself well-shaped perfection in body, character and intellect"³--, the *uomo universale*, the ideal of the image of man which the awakening and rising bourgeoisie gave to itself with reference to the humanistic reception of the culture of antiquity,⁴ and mostly also of the classical idea of *universitas litterarum* embodied mainly in the humanistic nature of science, in the conception of the personality of the scientist, and in the unity of teaching and research.⁵

In socialist society, general education, an essential element of the all-round developed personality, primarily relies on Marxist-Leninist philosophy.⁶ But naturally, it goes beyond it and embraces also knowledge and experience in the fields of culture and art.⁷ In that sense it is complex in nature. Being extended to the intellectual and cultural "tides of fortune" of other nations, it must furthermore be regarded as global and universal. In the *belles-lettres* that means, for instance, that one is familiar not only with the best works of the most important writers--present and past--in one's own country, but also of those of other countries--socialist, capitalist and developing countries. And here it is to be noted that general education requires the perfecting of all its aspects to be able to enrich specialized training with new characteristics and, above all, make possible a creative mode of life.⁸ In higher education, general education as a broad and solid basis definitely includes dealing with the theoretical principles of adjoining disciplines and with such special fields as philosophy, economics, history and logic. In philosophy it mainly is a matter of mastering historical and dialectic materialism. That alone enables us to develop the methods and methodologies that are adequate for the various sciences and to understand the objects of our inquiry in their dialectical interrelationship. Familiarity with the main tendencies in culture, literature and art also is part of general education in our higher education. Such a general education can be acquired only if the scientists, and mainly the higher education teachers among them, analyze the most important publications in the fields mentioned and read the best literary works. If the objection is made that there is not enough time for that, we only can say that this is in no way a problem of time but of intent, as a condition for overcoming one-sidedness and narrow specialization shown by some scientists. Diversification in the sense of such general education is, in turn, an important prerequisite for man's "encountering himself" in his quality as *genus humanum*, as a member of the human species. Acquiring a sound general education can be greatly facilitated by an unprejudiced and active attitude toward the heritage of one's own people and of other peoples.

General Education and Heritage Problem

Let it be affirmed that a proper receptivity for our heritage creates a relatively favorable subjective position, deepens historic self-awareness and can also help raise an individual striving for achievement as a clear sign of responsibility to history. We must proceed from the proposition, however, that "the past, while being a part that has died, is not a dead link of the development and survives today in material and ideational respects because society is a living organism that lives and dies every day while its overall existence is immortal."⁹

This raises the question what it is that is part of the heritage one must know, appropriate and cultivate. First that includes one's own national heritage as it was globally accounted for and listed, for instance, for the GDR, in the 30th GDR anniversary appeal of November 1977: primarily the heritage of the struggle of the revolutionary German workers movement, that of the fighters on the barricades in 1848/49, the "heritage of all humanistic forces of the German bourgeoisie."¹⁰ The Statute of the National Council of the GDR on the Cultivation and Dissemination of the German Cultural Heritage (Council of Ministers resolution of 11 September 1980) defines the cultivation and productive appropriation of the German cultural heritage and of the "heritage of world culture" as a constitutional mission for all state and social forces. That document further points out that the process of the continued shaping of the developed socialist society requires "also an ever more comprehensive and richer creative-critical relationship with everything our people and mankind have gained in insight throughout their history into the nature of the world and of man and have created in progressive ideals and cultural values, in beauty and poetry."¹¹ This evidently goes beyond the Greco-Roman heritage of antiquity where the most essential germ cells for our development today were somehow preformed. Logically, it seems to me, one should therefore also have to take account of the Sumerian, Akkadian, Babylonian (the Gilgamesh Epic), the Indian (the Mahabharata Epic), the Chinese (the Shih Ching Canon of Odes), and other legacies, a true gold mine of knowledge and insight. Something like it also applies to our philosophic heritage. V. I. Lenin, in his "Three Sources and Three Components of Marxism," remarks that Marxism as a theory did not originate "off the main road of the development of world civilization."¹² On the contrary, "Marxism acquired its world historic importance as the ideology of the revolutionary proletariat by not rejecting the most valuable achievements of the bourgeois era but, rather, appropriating and processing everything of value throughout the more than two thousand years of development in human thinking and human culture."¹³ This applies primarily to the doctrines of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism, the knowledge of which vastly facilitates our understanding of Marxism. It also sharpens the Marxist-Leninist critique of contemporary bourgeois ideology.¹⁴ To me, at least, it seems, however, whether one should not also know the progressive philosophic heritage of India and China is also worth considering.

Certain principles should be kept in mind, however, in our dealing with our legacy. First, we should not "conjure the dead" in world history but proceed from the contemporary requirements, interests, tasks and problems of socialist society. Second, our appropriation must be historical and critical, that is to say, the great achievements of past social eras must be understood in terms of their "social conditions and thus partly also in their contradictions."¹⁵ What is historically essential

in it should be brought out. What is historically contingent is subjected to criticism, what is historically essential, signifying progress, is appropriated.¹⁶ Third, this appropriation should be creative. That mainly means it being applied to contemporary conditions, whereby it is being further developed.¹⁷ That is an aspect pointed out already by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, under very different historic conditions, who said: "A deed presupposes something toward which it is directed, which it not merely augments or broadens by additional material, but which it, essentially, processes and transforms. Inheriting means receiving and assuming a heritage at once. What was received thus was changed and enriched and absorbed at once." Hegel says then also: "By appropriating it we turn it into something of our own compared with what it had been before."¹⁸ Fourth, we have to take note of the fact that the workers class needs neither "venerable disguise" nor resorting to tradition to make its world historic mission legitimate¹⁹ and that it is no mere executor of "great humanistic ideals and utopias of the past," as Comrade Kurt Hager put it.²⁰ It rather carries out its own liberation in conformity with real historic conditions. The bourgeoisie, on the other hand, at least during its period of emancipation, entreated the spirits of the past to lend their service and borrowed "their names, combat slogans, and costumes in staging the new scene of world history in such venerable disguise and in a borrowed language." The bourgeoisie thus needed "world historic reminiscences to anaesthetize itself in its own essential substance. The revolution of the 19th century has to have the dead bury its dead to get to its own substance. Either the catchphrase transcended the content or the content, the catchphrase."²¹ Meanwhile the bourgeoisie has departed from its own revolutionary traditions, denying its own progressive heritage.

A special aspect of a legacy is knowing about previous generations, which is of great importance to expanding cultural horizons. The attitude taken on it is important because the knowledge of today has its roots in earlier generations and eras. This was expressed with almost Doric simplicity by the Roman materialist Lucretius Carus in his famous philosophic poem "De rerum naturae" (About the Nature of things), as follows: "For from the one there evolved the other with increasing clarity/Until the development of mankind attained to the summit of culture."²² It should be obvious that no class and no generation starts from scratch but always from the store of ideas it has been given. In this it takes on, expands and revises former insights to cope with its own historic tasks²³ of relying on itself and making its own contribution to world culture.²⁴ This also consolidates and enriches socialist self-understanding because "what socialism is and means for men only he can deeply and permanently understand who holds on to the experiences and testimonials of history."²⁵ If one seeks to interdict the cultural, artistic and scientific past of one's own people and of other peoples, one smashes the "extremely efficient mirror that orients the trip into the future."²⁶ Our position on the knowledge of past generations and eras was, as is well known, most strikingly formulated by V. I. Lenin in his work, "The Tasks of the Youth Associations," where he says: "You would make a big mistake, however, were you to draw the inference that one can become a communist without first appropriating the knowledge accumulated by humanity. It would be erroneous to believe that it could suffice to appropriate communist slogans and the conclusions of communist science without first acquiring the sum total of all the knowledge the outcome of which is communism itself."²⁷ The successive appropriation of such knowledge calls for a universal-historical approach also in Schiller's sense ("What Is the Meaning and the Purpose of Studying Universal History?"), a *conditio sine qua non*, wherein the study of a universally conceived history of philosophy plays a special role. And universal

in this case means going beyond Europe, embracing and utilizing the intellectual achievements of other continents, regions, peoples and cultures, otherwise there would be the danger of a European-centered mode of looking at things which could at times bar our way to understanding global and complex interconnections in the past and present. Then it would be more justified to say that the achievements of past generations are "not simply stored in the temple of memory, as pictures of what has been but are as much at hand and as vivid as they were when they emerged. Those are effects and works that have not again been canceled or destroyed by what came subsequently. The elements in which they are preserved are not the canvas or the marble, not the paper nor their ideas and memory--elements which themselves are perishable or the soil of what passes--but it is thought itself, that into which no moths or thieves penetrate."²⁸ In all this, receptively loitering in a "gallery of the great minds," conceived of in a complex, global and universal-historic manner, is no end in itself but serves perfectly concrete and sturdy objectives.

The importance of general education for man and society in socialism cannot be overrated because it is a means, goal and criterion of personality development.²⁹ General education furthermore provides assured conduct and significantly improves the ability to take issue successfully with bourgeois ideology. What is important here, it seems to me, is to have broader knowledge than the bourgeois opponents or at least not to be inferior to them in knowledge. Another advantage of general education is that it lends a higher meaning to life and can contribute to genuine and permanent human happiness, if it accompanies the existence of socialist ideals and values.³⁰

The proper proportion between general education and specialized knowledge moreover is an important prerequisite for personal harmony.³¹ But if there is specialized knowledge without adequate general education, one becomes a useable machine, as Albert Einstein remarked in 1952, if somewhat hyperbolically, but no full-value personality. Then, according to Einstein, one resembles more a well trained dog than a harmoniously developed personality.³²

Not to be ignored, furthermore, are the advantages of general education for teaching as it enhances the scientist's radiating strength and for research, in that, e.g., the present is understood as the connecting link between the past and the future. This improves the capacity for a better comprehension of interconnections and for making statements, including prognostic ones.

In conclusion it may be said that the scientists, especially the higher education teachers, as the ones who teach at our higher education institutions, have to acquire a broad general education, mainly by making an extensive use of literature marked by diversification (other disciplines, belles-lettres), which incidentally also benefits their specializations. As far as the students are concerned, it is recommended to make some instruction optional for lecture courses open to anyone in the university on overlapping subjects, in line with what Comrade Kurt Hager has asked should be done. For the time being, the first activities of this kind are to be registered.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 6/7 September 1980.
2. Cf. further G. Neuner, "Zur Theorie der sozialistischen Allgemeinbildung" (On the Theory of Socialist General Education), Berlin, 1975, p 25.
3. Cf. K.-H. Guenther, "Some Historical Aspects of the Relationship Between Science, World-Outlook and General Education," DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHILOSOPHIE, No 9, 1978, p 1104.
4. Cf. F. Hofmann, "Allgemeinbildung, eine problemgeschichtliche Studie" (General Education--Study on the History of a Problem), Berlin, 1966, p 13.
5. Cf. D. Bergner, "Universitas Litterarum Today," DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHILOSOPHIE, No 8, 1978, p 941.
6. In this regard, K.-F. Wessel is to be endorsed without reservation, who wrote that Marxist-Leninist philosophy "is not just a random element of the general education of the socialist personality but, principally, the integrating and orienting factor," in "On the Dialectics of General Education," DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHILOSOPHIE, No 9, 1978, p 119.
7. Cf. further W. S. Schultze, ed., "Handbuch der Musikerziehung" (Handbook for Music Education), Leipzig, 1974, p 23.
8. Also cf. F. Hofmann, whose definition of general education can be accepted without reservation. Essentially, it goes like this: "By general education we understand an education that comprises all essential human abilities, character traits and capacities, oriented to the social requirements of production, science, and political and cultural life and representing an indispensable foundation for all special training and for a creative life-style," in "Allgemeinbildung . . .," op. cit., p 11.
9. Cf. W. Sellnow, "Gesellschaft--Staat--Recht, Zur Kritik der buergerlichen Ideologie ueber die Entstehung von Gesellschaft, Staat und Recht" (Society--State--Law--In Critique of the Bourgeois Ideology on the Origin of Society, State and Law), Berlin, 1976, p XI.
10. Cf. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 18 November 1977.
11. Cf. "Gesetzblatt" Part I, 1980, No 28.
12. V. I. Lenin, "Werke" (Works), Vol 19, Berlin, 1962, p 3.
13. Ibid., Vol 31, Berlin, 1959, p 308.
14. Cf. further G. Heinrich and A. Liepert, "Progressive Philosophic Heritage and Socialist Consciousness," DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHILOSOPHIE, No 9, 1973, p 1378.

15. Cf. H.-D. Dahlke, "Erbe und Tradition in der Literatur" (Heritage and Tradition in Literature), Leipzig, 1977, pp 37 and 40.
16. Cf. further E. Gottschling, H. Kuntzschke and H. Schroeder, "The Marxist-Leninist Concept of History and Our Heritage in Political Science and Jurisprudence," STAAT UND RECHT, No 5, 1963, p 827.
17. Cf. further B. Brentjes, "On the Problem of Humanism and the Image of Man in the Orient," WISSENSCHAFTLICHE ZEITSCHRIFT DER FRIEDRICH SCHILLER UNIVERSITAET JENA, SPRACHWISSENSCHAFTLICHE BEITRAEGE (Ancient and Socialist Humanism), Nos 5-6, 1972, p 798.
18. Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, "Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie" (Introduction to the History of Philosophy), Berlin, 1966, p 14.
19. Cf. H. Naumann, "On the Heritage Concept in Lenin's Theory of Culture," W. Mittenzweil and K. Weisbach, eds., "Revolution und Literatur, zum Verhaeltnis von Erbe, Revolution und Literatur" (Revolution and Literature--On the Relationship Between Heritage, Revolution and Literature), Leipzig, 1971, p 405.
20. Cf. K. Hager, "Zu Fragen der Kulturpolitik der SED" (ON SED Cultural Policy Questions), Berlin, 1972, p 57.
21. Cf. K. Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," K. Marx/P. Engels, "Werke," Vol 8, Berlin, 1960, pp 115 and 117.
22. Quoted from W. Nestle, "Die Nachsokratiker" (The Post-Socratics), Vol 1, Jena, 1923, p 282.
23. Cf. H. Nathan et al, "Theses on the German Heritage in Political Science and Jurisprudence," STAAT UND RECHT, No 5, 1962, p 132 (Thesis 5).
24. Cf. also H. Ley, "Geschichte der Aufklaerung und des Atheismus" (History of Enlightenment and Atheism), Vol 2/1, Berlin, 1970, p 17.
25. Cf. Hager, op. cit., pp 57-58.
26. Cf. W. Girnus, "Wozu Literatur? Reden, Essays, Gespraechе" (Literature for What? Speeches, Essays, Conversations), Leipzig, 1976, p 167.
27. V. I. Lenin, "Werke," Vol 31, Berlin, 1965, p 275.
28. Cf. Hegel, op. cit., p 71.
29. Cf. Wessel, op. cit., p 1116.
30. Cf. in part also L. M. Archangelski, "Kategorien der marxistischen Ethik" (Categories of Marxist Ethics), Berlin, 1965, p 270.

31. Cf. further F. Adler and A. Kretschmar, "Processes and Levels in the Social Determinants of Socialist Personality," DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE, No 8, 1978, p 833.
32. Cf. also E. Albrecht, "Weltanschauung--Methodologie--Sprache" (World-Outlook--Methodology--Language), Berlin, 1979, p 9.

5885

CSO: 2300/220

SOLIDARITY SPOKESMAN REVEALS BEHIND SCENES TALKS WITH PARTY

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 10 Apr 81 p 9

[Article by Martin Burcharth]

[Text] Warsaw--"We were threatened with martial law," said the new Solidarity press spokesman. In an interview with INFORMATION he spoke of the tense negotiations before Solidarity called off the threatened general strike following the police action in Bydgoszcz.

Few outsiders have been able to realize what happened during the recent negotiations between the Polish government and the free trade union, Solidarity. For 2 weeks Poland's fate hung by a thin thread--most observers agreed on that. But only the actors knew what really went on behind the scenes.

In a talk with Solidarity's national spokesman, INFORMATION had an opportunity to see events as Polish union leaders experienced them. The press spokesman, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, told of the pressure put on Solidarity by the government. He did not use the term "civil war" but hinted this could be the consequence of a general strike in a socialist country.

For a period of time the government and the party were convinced that Solidarity wanted to seize power in Poland. The situation demanded quick and intelligent decisions. The four Solidarity negotiators were short of time. They were isolated from the outside world. They did not have the same resources as the government negotiators. Even so they made the right decisions and recalled the general strike.

Split in Solidarity

This created a split within the national council of the union which met the day after in Gdansk. People in prominent posts were dismissed or else they resigned. Solidarity's unity was shaken but again this colorful social movement seemed able to survive a crisis. It took 3 days of meetings. Newly-appointed spokesman for Solidarity Janusz Onyszkiewicz told us the following about negotiations in the last few weeks:

"As you know the negotiations were quite lengthy. We can go back to our national council meeting on 24 March. On a secret ballot a national strike committee was appointed. It consisted mainly of representatives from the largest regions of the country. There were 11 members who were supposed to negotiate but the problem was that their task was not clearly defined. It was said that both before and during the strike they would have unlimited authority but it was not quite clear what powers they were to have. Only one thing was sure--they did not have the right to call off the strike. That was in the hands of the national council.

"The strike committee divided up into two groups. Four of them went to Warsaw to negotiate. They were Walesa, Gwiazda, Slowik and Jurczyk along with Celinski who was just the secretary. He was never elected to anything. He was supposed to serve a technical function but he interpreted his functions quite broadly. And this came back on him Wednesday. He assumed much too large a role.

Celinski Removed

"During the national council meeting after the strike was called off Celinski was removed by a vote of 17 to 13. Was he well-liked? No, he was useful. I think everyone was somewhat skeptical about his position. He really seemed a little pushy. For example he sometimes signed documents for the national council along with Walesa, Gwiazda and Slowik. It was completely laughable and quite unacceptable. As it turned out he tried to play a quite influential role which no one wanted him to play.

"So these four people negotiated with the government. The others prepared the strike in Gdansk. There were lots of things to do so it was obvious not everyone could go to Warsaw. However the problem was that contact between the four negotiators and the others in Gdansk was very poor. There were four people from the strike committee there plus a few experts--Mazowiecki, Gieremek and Sila-Nowicki. They were the main experts but there were also others running around at the Hotel Solec in Gdansk, where they were staying. The unfortunate thing was that they could not communicate over the telephone. They were afraid the phones were bugged. So they were unable to discuss openly what was happening."

Walesa's Explanation

Onyszkiewicz went on: "The story, as Walesa told us, was that he constantly told them over the phone that they would not give in an inch in the negotiations. He also repeated this at the Ursus Tractor Factory and at the Huta Warsaw Iron and Steel Plant. They held fast and would only call off the strike if the government conceded every single point. That was on Saturday and Sunday. That is why the compromise on Monday came as such a shock. Of course this applied more to members of the national council who knew what Walesa had said than to the general public. His uncompromising stand was not widely known. The ordinary members were happy about it while the activists on the national council were furious.

"That was one of the problems. Another concerned the closed doors for in comparison with the negotiations in Gdansk last August these were quite different. For instance there was no public supervision. The experts were also accused of

having prevented other union leaders from getting in touch with the four negotiators. They formed a kind of screen because they were very afraid of the harsh steps the government would take in the event of a general strike.

"Another problem was that the people in the Hotel Solec were isolated. The only people they could express their feelings and opinions to were the experts. In this way the opinions of the experts replaced those of the union. There was a feeling that the experts decided to manipulate things a little and put pressure on the negotiating group in the same way the government did. This is a feeling that goes back to August. In Gdansk the experts always said we shouldn't be too aggressive. For example there was a big dispute between the strike committee and the experts about whether they should demand the release of all political prisoners. The experts said: Don't do it. You have already gained so much. Don't take a chance. It is a general feeling among the activists that the experts play an intimidating role."

[Question] But wasn't there an actual government threat about declaring a state of emergency?

[Answer] The national council said the government had threatened a military state of emergency, a state of martial law, that would be introduced in the event of a general strike. Right away, immediately. And it was said openly that blood would be shed.

[Question] Did they threaten to call in the army?

[Answer] That was not said but it was clear that it would not be the Polish army and probably not the Polish army at all. [as written] There were all kinds of rumors that Soviet troops were approaching and the airport in Warsaw was closed to traffic. They were playing for high stakes, in other words.

Another indication was the extension of the Warsaw Pact maneuvers. Yes and the fact that they started calling up members of the reserve and asked army officers to stay at home and be prepared. There were also reports from reliable sources that the Polish transport company, PKS [State Motor Transport], had received orders to fill up the gas tanks so their vehicles would be ready to roll. It was not said for what purpose but it was quite clear that the vehicles were intended for troop transport.

[Question] Did the rest of the strike committee in Gdansk know anything about these threats?

[Answer] They knew some of them, but not all. It was a psychological problem. They sat in the Solec Hotel in complete isolation and therefore vulnerable. At the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk in August 1980 they had the direct support of the workers. Now there were only four of them plus the experts in total isolation. This must have been an enormous problem psychologically.

Isolation Strategy

Precisely. [as written] The negotiators were also in the same situation. They could not make quick decisions since they had not been authorized to call off the strike. The idea was that the national council would come to Warsaw Monday afternoon. There was no other way to call off the strike. But Walesa was afraid the national council's presence in Warsaw would convince the government that the strike would be called off since that was the only function of the council during the negotiations. In other words they had the problem that the presence of the national council in Warsaw would put them in a weaker position.

[Question] The original deadline for calling off the strike was last Monday at 1500 hours. Then it was extended to 2000 hours. Why was that?

[Answer] It was a tactical move on the part of the government but they also wanted to consult on at least one more thing, namely the Bydgoszcz point. They also agreed that the strike could not be called off by 1500 hours--for technical reasons. Time was needed to stop everything. But then they agreed to extend the deadline to 2000 hours.

But when Walesa turned up at the press conference and postponed the decision on the strike to the next day's meeting in Gdansk it was clear to everyone that it would be impossible to vote for a strike at the meeting. It was a kind of fait accompli.

Consultation on Bydgoszcz

They had to extend the deadline to 2000 hours since they had to consult on at least one more point, namely Bydgoszcz. Both sides. The compromise on this point was reached together with people from Bydgoszcz. Of course those people didn't get everything they wanted but we were afraid the whole thing would fall through if we didn't get something on the Bydgoszcz issue. That is why we extended the deadline.

[Question] But after it was extended was it impossible to go out on strike the next day?

[Answer] No, it was quite possible. No one knew what was taking place. No one knew what would be in the communique. Everything was set. I went home in the afternoon to get a few things together and was called back at 2000 hours. I asked what had happened but all they would say was that I should come right away. I was sure we were going through with it. I took my sleeping bag under my arm and made sure my door was locked properly since I was not sure how long I would be away.

But it was quite obvious that as soon as the strike was postponed a day everything was over. Everyone felt relieved. It was a kind of psychological demobilization. The balloon had been punctured. What is debatable is whether the negotiators could have consulted the members of the national council about the outcome.

Polish Mafia

The negotiators did not ask for advice and the feeling is they did not want to do so because they were afraid the council simply would not accept a decision to call off the strike. That is what the experts have been blamed for. Presumably that is what they planned and they succeeded.

[Question] Does Solidarity have clear proof of who was behind the Bydgoszcz affair?

[Answer] We don't have any proof that could be used in court. But we have our suspicions. Sometimes a thing is quite obvious but it can't be proved, just like the Mafia.

[Question] Who is the Polish Mafia?

[Answer] I think you know who I mean.... We hope the police will not become scapegoats and therefore leak some information during a trial.

[Question] As you said before the agreement was reached under the threat of bloodshed by the government. The government can't very well repeat that strategy every month, so isn't it correct that almost nothing was gained except the lifting of strike preparations?

[Answer] The strategy won't succeed another time. We are getting more and more experience not only in negotiating but also in organizing strikes. Friday's warning strike was almost perfect. One day the organizing of a general strike will be "peanuts." A snap of the fingers. But organizing a general strike for an indefinite period of time is something else. That really means running almost the entire country. This time we were almost ready but we don't actually know how it would have gone. In some areas we were not well enough prepared. Food supplies were already organized in cooperation with the farmers. We were afraid the government would try to isolate especially the biggest factories and then end the strike by holding back supplies.

[Question] The government was apparently afraid of a strike. Would it have shown that the government is isolated from most of the people?

[Answer] I must tell you that among party conservatives and especially among our neighbors there was a feeling that Friday's warning strike was a dress rehearsal for seizing power.

[Question] During the first day's meeting in Gdansk by the national council the Warsaw section suggested that the government be held to implementing the agreement within a certain time limit if Solidarity for its part called off the strike preparations. Did they vote on that?

[Answer] It was suggested by several speakers but for one reason or another it was never voted on. We just wanted to give the government a deadline for accepting the agreement.

Strike Preparations

In addition there was some discussion on strike preparations since a general strike is a serious matter. All factory committees must be available to help. A safety net must be organized and worker guards must keep an eye on the factories. This takes a lot out of people but if this is not done we're sounding a false alarm. That is why we decided to call off strike preparations and only in Bydgoszcz was a state of readiness maintained. It is psychologically important to give people a feeling that if something goes wrong they can always react immediately.

The first day at the meeting in Gdansk we discussed the agreement mainly. Everyone knew it was not very satisfactory but progress was made on two points. Clearing up the Bydgoszcz affair and making membership in the farmers' Solidarity union legal. The government had hinted that the formation of a union for farmers could be resolved in parliament. I think that will happen.

[Question] How long will that take?

[Answer] About a month. These two points I mentioned were the most important ones. On other points we got almost nothing. The farmers' Solidarity was very important since we were under pressure from the farmers.

[Question] In a report in the capital newspaper ZYCIE WARSZAWY it said that certain members of the national council suggested forming a leadership of 3-5 people and that Walesa offered to resign.

[Answer] One must remember the atmosphere that prevails during such a meeting. There are hundreds of suggestions and some of them are not even discussed. If one points to one suggestion alone one can easily get a distorted picture. This was actually not discussed at all, just mentioned. Walesa said he would resign but it was not a threat. You know this was not the first time and it won't be the last. His position as leader was not threatened at any time. Everyone knows he is indispensable for the homogeneity of the movement, even though one may well disagree with his work style.

Role of Experts Changed

[Question] Some new directives were also proposed for conducting negotiations with the government in the future. Is it true that the entire national council of over 30 members will take part in future negotiations?

[Answer] No decision has been made yet. We are working on nine proposals. But everything indicates that the role of the experts will be changed. There were some very drastic proposals that would deprive the experts of the right to talk to the government at all.

My proposal was that the experts should be allowed to negotiate with the government but they must not come up with their own proposals. They can only argue for

our viewpoints or against those of the government. Of course they can make suggestions along with the union delegates. Another proposal was that the negotiating group should be replaced in the event of lengthy negotiations. Negotiation leaders would then take care of continuity. A third idea was to have observers present who would not participate in the discussions but who would be allowed to make comments afterward.

[Question] Was there a proposal to end secret negotiations?

[Answer] Yes, there were some who suggested that negotiations should be broadcast live on television. But 24-hour negotiations.... Others suggested that the minutes be made available to the public.

Critics of the System

[Question] You have said that a fair trial of critics of the system might solve this problem. Could you expand that?

[Answer] I would guess they would be released after a trial. All of them, both the people from the human rights group KOR [Committee for Social Self Defense] and those from the Confederation for Independent Poland [KPN], have already been in jail for periods of time. Wouldn't it come out even? I think the government will conduct the trials as a kind of gesture for our neighbors. They need a formal condemnation of dissidents but they don't want to create martyrs.

[Question] One of the biggest sensations during the meeting in Gdansk was that vice chairman Andrzej wanted to resign.

[Answer] Yes, during the meeting Walesa explained that he had been forced to make a quick decision on Monday. He felt it was extremely important to call off the strike. And since it was impossible to consult the national council which was in Gdansk he had to go directly to the people. It was something like deGaulle's style. He turned directly to the nation, going around the government and parliament. A populist form.

Gwiazda could not accept that. He stood up during the meeting and said to Walesa: "You have ruined our union democracy." Then he left the room. But he was quickly called back and received a unanimous vote of confidence. I think his reaction was more an emotional one than actual opposition to Lech Walesa.

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. Closed negotiations. In contrast to the negotiations that led in August 1980 to the signing of the historic Gdansk agreement the latest fullscale negotiations between Solidarity and the government occurred without the involvement of the public. People came in vain, as here at the office of the Warsaw section, hoping to hear current news. After the compromise was reached many members of the Solidarity leadership protested the procedure which they felt was a violation of the democratic principles of the union.

2. Solidarity leader Lech Walesa consults one of the organization's advisers during the tough negotiations in Gdansk. This takes place over morning coffee at the Hotel Solec where the negotiation group and the experts were isolated from the outside world while the negotiations took place. Lech Walesa has been sharply criticized for not involving the other Solidarity leaders, which he says was impossible. The role of the experts has also been under review.
3. Lech Walesa at the press conference right after the negotiations between the government and Solidarity ended on 30 March. These negotiations led to calling off the planned general strike. There have since been sharp internal disputes in Solidarity about the course and outcome of the negotiations.

6578

CSO: 3106/116

AMENDED DECREE ON BORDER GUARDS PUBLISHED

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 28, 17 Apr 81 pp 1-7

[Decree No 678/1969 of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania on the System for Guarding the State Border of the Socialist Republic of Romania*]

[Text] The State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Chapter I
General Provisions

Article 1. The guard for the state border of the Socialist Republic of Romania is provided, according to law, by the border-guard troops under the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense.

For providing the guard and protecting the state border, the border-guard troops co-operate with the other branch commands of the Ministry of National Defense, with the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior and with the executive committees and bureaus of the people's councils.

In fulfilling the mission of guarding the state border, the border-guard troops also rely on the public watch in the communes located in the border zone and on the voluntary cooperation of the citizens.

Article 2. For providing the guard for the state border, there are formed:

a) The border zone, composed of the territory of the communes, cities and municipalities that have, according to the administrative organization of the territory of the Socialist Republic of Romania, a common boundary with the state border, less the territory of the municipality of Constanta. The localities included in the border zone will be brought to the cognizance of the population through the good offices of the executive committees of the people's councils of the counties adjacent to the state border;

* Republished on the basis of Article III of State Council Decree No 61 of 25 March 1981, published in BULETINUL OFICIAL AL REPUBLICII SOCIALISTE ROMANIA, Part I, No 17, 25 March 1981, with a new numbering being given to the chapters, sections and articles.

Decree No 678/1969 was published in BULETINUL OFICIAL, No 106, 7 October 1969.

b) The 20-meter-wide strip of the border-guard troops, along the state border, except for the coast of the Black Sea and the ports on the Danube located on the border.

The width of the strip of the border-guard troops is established starting from the state borderline, for the land border, and from the high-water mark, with the exception of cases of flooding, for the water border.

In the places in the immediate vicinity of the border in which the land is swampy or subject to erosion or avalanches or where protective dikes have been built, and in the case of the islands on which arrangements are not possible, the strip of the border-guard troops is formed farther inward.

The strip of the border-guard troops is administered by the border-guard units, except for the land associated with constructions and installations belonging to the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of the Interior or other socialist units. On this land the border-guard troops have the right to circulate and to install guard posts and means for providing the guard for the state border.

The land areas contained between the strip of the border-guard troops formed farther inward and the borderline are administered by the socialist units to which they belong, in compliance with the norms of the present decree.

Chapter II The Duties of the Border Guard Troops

Article 3. For fulfilling the mission that devolves upon them, the border-guard troops have the following duties:

a) They organize and carry out the guard along the state border of the Socialist Republic of Romania;

b) They supervise the air space along the state border, the territorial sea and the border waters of the Socialist Republic of Romania;

c) Through the border representatives, they provide for compliance with the state border system established by means of treaties concluded by the Socialist Republic of Romania with neighboring states;

d) They organize and carry out cooperation with the border-guard bodies of neighboring states;

e) They provide the guard, the maintenance and the restoration of border signs and perform the work needed for keeping in good condition the border corridor established by means of treaties concluded with neighboring states;

f) They inspect the persons, means of transportation and other property that, according to agreements between the Socialist Republic of Romania and neighboring states, have the right to cross the border, on the basis of legal documents, through places other than the checkpoints for crossing the state border;

g) To a depth of 30-40 km from the borderline toward the interior, they take the steps necessary to discover, identify and detain persons who have committed border

infractions. The exceeding of this limit is allowed in special situations and in the case of actions of pursuit;

h) They perform engineering work and install means of signaling in the border zone, and during the actions for discovering, identifying and detaining persons who have committed border infractions--also to the depth mentioned in Letter g of the present article;

i) They organize the application and check on the observance of the rules of the border system;

j) In cooperation with the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior, they carry out the guard on the interior Danube, using border-guard vessels;

k) They stop and escort for investigations, in the ports of the Socialist Republic of Romania, ships that have violated the legal provisions on the system of the territorial sea and border waters;

l) They use weapons in fulfilling official missions, in conformity with the legal norms;

m) They perform any other duties established by law.

Article 4. In the case of border infractions, the border-guard officers perform acts of criminal investigation and the border-guard noncommissioned officers have the right to draw up documents on findings, in conformity with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Chapter III The Support Groups of the Border Guards

Article 5. In order to provide the guard for the state border of the Socialist Republic of Romania, the border-guard troops will be supported by subunits of the patriotic guards specially intended and trained for this purpose and by support groups of the border guards formed of detachments for training young people to defend the homeland and of other citizens who perform activities in the vicinity of the border.

Article 6. The support groups of the border guards are organized in the localities located in the border zone and on the coast of the Black Sea, according to the criterion of residence or workplace, including during seasonal activities, in relation to the needs for providing the guard for the state border.

Article 7. The use of the patriotic-guard subunits and the support groups of the border guards to help guard the state border will be done with the approval of the chairman of the local defense council. The patriotic-guard subunits will be used in conformity with the plans for cooperation drawn up by the county headquarters of the patriotic guards and the commanders of the border-guard units.

Article 8. The fighters in the patriotic-guard subunits and the members of the support groups of the border guards who distinguish themselves in executing the entrusted tasks can be recompensed with rewards in money or of another nature by the Ministry of National Defense, Border Guard Troop Command.

State decorations of the Socialist Republic of Romania can be conferred on the persons mentioned in Paragraph 1 for special deeds or merits.

Article 9. The matter of removing from production the fighters in the patriotic-guard subunits and the members of the support groups of the border guards to participate in the missions for providing the guard for the state border will be done only by way of exception.

The fighters in the patriotic-guard subunits and the members of the support groups of the border guards, during the time that they are removed from production to participate in the missions for providing the guard for the state border, will receive the pay rights from the socialist units where they are employed. In addition, in the case of the loss of the ability to work, occurring under these circumstances, they receive, as the case may be, medical assistance, medicine, hospitalization and a pension, under the conditions provided by law to be granted to worker personnel for work accidents or occupational illnesses.

Chapter IV The Border System

Section I Access and Circulation in the Border Zone

Article 10. Persons coming to a locality in the border zone are obligated to appear at the local body of the militia, within 24 hours after arrival, to report the duration of the stay in that locality.

Minors below 14 years coming to a locality located in the border zone will be reported to the body of the militia by the adults who accompany them or to whom they come, within the period mentioned in Paragraph 1. Minors who attend classes at a school located in the border zone and who have access on the basis of the student-body card are an exception.

Persons who go for official purposes to a locality located in the border zone for a period greater than 30 days are obligated to appear at the body of the militia for the making of the residence-establishment notation in the identity document.

Article 11. Foreign citizens and persons without citizenship have access to localities in the border zone on the basis of a legal identity document and under the conditions established by means of the legal norms regarding the movement of these persons.

Article 12. The following are excepted from the obligation to appear and report the duration of the stay at the body of the militia:

- a) Persons living in localities located in the border zone, when they go to a neighboring locality also located in the border zone, to fairs, people's assemblies or other events with an organized character;
- b) Worker personnel who have the workplace in localities in the border zone but live outside these localities and go daily to work;

- c) Military personnel in the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of the Interior coming for official purposes to localities located in the border zone;
- d) Persons who hold management positions in the party and state apparatus, mentioned in the appendix,* which is an integral part of the present decree.

Article 13. Worker personnel in the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications who perform maintenance, repair and construction work on communication ways, telecommunication lines and the fairway, as well as supervisory and navigation-control personnel, have access on the basis of the identity document and the job or travel order signed by the head of the socialist unit in which they are employed.

Access to the border zone on the basis of the documents mentioned in Paragraph 1 is also permitted to the customs-inspection authorities of the General Directorate of Customhouses who go to subordinate units at the checkpoints for crossing the state border and the worker personnel in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry who travel on ocean fishing vessels.

The worker personnel of the socialist units located in the border zone have access to the workplace on the basis of the identity document and the job identity card signed by the head of the unit in which they are employed. The series, the number of the identity document, and the issuing body will be indicated on the identity document.

Article 14. The access of persons, including the personnel of the socialist units, to the strip of the border-guard troops and up to the borderline is permitted only with the approval of the commander of the border-guard unit, which will be requested at least 24 hours in advance.

The persons mentioned in Paragraph 1 are obligated to comply with the conditions for access to the strip of the border-guard troops and up to the borderline established by the commanders of the border-guard units on the obtaining of approval.

Article 15. Access to the border zone, up to the strip of the border-guard troops, is permitted in the daytime to persons who participate in the performance of farm-work, maintenance work on communications and telecommunications and other work, provided that they have on them identity documents with which they can prove that they are in one of the following situations:

- a) They live in the locality in the border zone where the work is performed or in a locality adjacent to it, also located in the border zone;
- b) They are employed in work for socialist units or physical persons with headquarters in a locality located in the border zone;
- c) They are registered, or excepted from registration, at the bodies of the militia.

The obligation to have on them identity documents also devolves upon other persons who reside or live temporarily in the border zone.

* The appendix has been communicated to the institutions involved.

Article 16. The circulation of persons at night, with or without means of transportation, to a depth of 2,000 meters from the state borderline toward the interior, for the land border, and from the high-water mark, for the water border, is permitted only on the public roads that will be established, through a decision, by the executive committees of the people's councils of the counties adjacent to the state border, with the agreement of the commanders of the border-guard units and of the bodies of the county militia.

The public roads on which circulation is prohibited at night will be signposted, through the good offices of the executive committees of the county people's councils, with illuminated indicators, accompanied by additional signboards, with the specification of the hours for prohibition of circulation.

The staying of persons at night to a depth of 2,000 meters from the borderline toward the interior, for the land border, and from the high-water mark, for the water border, outside the buildable perimeter of the localities, is permitted only with the approval of, and under the conditions established by, the commanders of the border-guard units. Approval will be requested at least 24 hours in advance.

The installation of campsites, camps and tents and the parking of motor vehicles in the border zone in other places than those established by the executive committees or bureaus of the people's councils of the municipalities, cities and communes, with the agreement of the commanders of the border-guard units, are forbidden.

Article 17. Means of transportation belonging to physical persons, socialist units or other organizations in localities located in the border zone will be parked in specially intended places, according to law.

The obligation mentioned in Paragraph 1 also devolves upon physical persons, socialist units or other organizations that temporarily operate means of transportation in the border zone.

The guard for airplanes and helicopters that perform utility and sport activities in the border zone will be provided by the Department of Civil Aviation, using for this purpose armed watchmen whom the socialist units benefiting from the prestations are obligated to put at its disposal, with the advice of the Ministry of the Interior.

The flights, planned and approved, of airplanes and helicopters that perform utility and sport activities in the border zone will be communicated to the Border Guard Troop Command by the Military Aviation Command within the periods stipulated by the system for flying in the air space of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

Article 18. The sowing of high crops--corn, sunflowers or other such crops--is permitted up to the distance of 50 meters from the strip of the border-guard troops.

For providing the guard for the state border, in special situations, in certain directions, the commanders of the border-guard units, with the agreement of the local bodies of the state administration, can increase this limit up to 250 meters.

In the cases required by the need to consolidate the land, the protective stands along railroads, roads and waterways can also be grown within the strip of the border-guard troops, with the prior approval of the Border Guard Troop Command.

Article 19. Hunting along the state border to the depth of 500 meters from the borderline toward the interior, for the land border, and from the high-water mark, for the water border, is forbidden.

The organized hunting of predators, to the depth mentioned in Paragraph 1, is allowed only in the daytime from the borderline toward the interior, on the basis of decisions issued by the executive committees of the people's councils of the counties adjacent to the state border and with the prior agreement of the Border Guard Troop Command.

Article 20. The pasturing of animals is permitted in the daytime up to the strip of the border-guard troops and in the nighttime up to the distance of 500 meters from the borderline, for the land border, and from the high-water mark, for the water border.

Article 21. Any construction work to a depth of 500 meters from the borderline toward the interior, for the land border, and from the high-water mark, for the water border, outside the precincts of villages or the buildable perimeter of cities and municipalities, will be done after the obtaining of all the legal approvals, including that of the Border Guard Troop Command.

The construction of sheepfolds and shelters and the storage of straw, hay, corn cobs and other such fodder or technical plants to a depth of 500 meters from the borderline toward the interior, for the land border, and from the high-water mark, for the water border, along the entire state border, are forbidden.

The manner of performance of activities in the construction zone is established, at least 15 days before the start of work, by the commanders of the border-guard units together with the heads of the respective socialist units.

Article 22. The manner of use of border waters for sport fishing, swimming, sunbathing, water supplying and animal watering is established through decisions of the executive committees or bureaus of the people's councils of the municipalities, cities and communes in the border zone, with the prior agreement of the commanders of the border-guard units, in relation to the population's needs.

The executive committees or bureaus of the people's councils of the municipalities, cities and communes in the border zone will take steps to mark the places permitted for watering and swimming and to post the rules for use of border waters.

Sport fishing and swimming by persons in the roadstead of the ports located in the border zone are forbidden.

Article 23. Industrial fishing in border waters is done in an organized way, in the daytime, in compliance with the legal provisions and the following rules:

- a) The fisherman is obligated to have on him the identity card, the fishing license, the border-guard permit and the boat license. The border-guard permit is also mandatory for the members of crews of fishing vessels;
- b) The fishing vessels and boats will bear the flags and identifying markings stipulated by the legal provisions in force.

Industrial fishing in border waters in the nighttime is done in compliance with the provisions of Paragraph 1 and only with the approval of the commanders of the border-guard units, except for the cases when it is provided otherwise by means of international agreements concluded with other riparian states.

Article 24. Sport fishing in border waters is allowed only in the daytime, from sunrise to sunset, on the shore, provided that the fishermen also possess a border-guard permit.

The General Association of Sport Hunters and Fishermen, with the agreement of the commanders of the border-guard units, will mark, delimit and post the conditions and the zones in which sport fishing is done.

Article 25. The border-guard permits are issued at the request of the socialist units or the sport fishermen, which will be addressed, as the case may be, to the commanders of the border-guard units or the Border Guard Troop Command.

The border-guard permits are endorsed annually by the issuing body.

Article 26. The boats, as well as any other craft, with or without propulsion, for pleasure, sport, fishing and "Salvamar" service can be possessed and used only if they are registered at the harbor master's office or, where there are no harbor master's offices, at the executive committees or bureaus of the people's councils of the municipalities, cities and communes.

The boats and craft are kept at the shore of the border waters in specially arranged places, marked with indicators, provided and guarded through the good offices of those who possess and use them. These places will be established by the bodies at which the boats and craft are registered, with the agreement of the commanders of the border-guard units.

In the period when the boats and craft are no longer used due to the cessation of the activities for which they are intended or to seasonal conditions, they will be raised from the water, stored on land in specially arranged places and provided with a guard.

The possession, parking, mooring, stopping at anchor, and use of pleasure, sport, fishing and "Salvamar" boats and craft, without the fulfillment of the conditions stipulated in the present article, are forbidden.

Article 27. Tours for visiting facilities with an economic, historical or touristic character located in the strip of the border-guard troops or between this strip and the borderline are made only in the daytime, with all the legal approvals being obtained, including that of the commanders of the border-guard units.

Article 28. Conducted tours in border waters, with vessels other than those that make regular passenger cruises, are made with the approval, as the case may be, of the commanders of the border-guard units at the place of embarkation or of the Border Guard Troop Command.

When tours are organized with vessels belonging to the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications, other than those intended for regular passenger cruises, the

approval of the commanders of the border-guard units is not necessary. In these situations, the organizers of the tours will communicate, 24 hours in advance, the route that they take to the checkpoints for crossing the state border, when the embarkation is done at these points, or to the border-guard subunits, when the embarkation is done outside the border-crossing points.

Vessels with tourists do not have permission to moor except in the ports of the Socialist Republic of Romania located on the stated route. In cases of absolute necessity, the mooring will be able to be done at any point on the shore of Romanian territory, with the first border-guard post being informed immediately.

The provisions of this article also apply to the possessors of privately owned boats.

Article 29. The approvals mentioned in articles 27 and 28 of the present decree will be requested at least 24 hours before the date for making the tours. The Ministry of Tourism, from case to case, will also be able to request approvals in less than this period.

Article 30. The organization of nautical competitions in border waters is permitted with the approval of the commanders of the border-guard units, requested at least 5 days before the date of the competition.

Sport craft do not have permission to moor except at the points established by means of the program of the competition. In cases of absolute necessity, the mooring of the craft will be able to be done at any point on the shore of Romanian territory, with the first border-guard post being informed immediately.

Article 31. Persons who travel or perform activities in the vicinity of the state border are forbidden:

- a) To cross the state border without authorization;
- b) To violate the air space and territorial waters of neighboring states;
- c) To fire weapons across the state border;
- d) To damage or destroy the border signs and the technical means of guarding of the border guards;
- e) To illuminate the territory of neighboring states with beacons, searchlights or other means;
- f) To produce or extend fires across the border;
- g) To hold conversations across the border with unauthorized persons;
- h) To photograph the territory of neighboring states;
- i) To make an unauthorized exchange of objects and correspondence across the state border;

j) To let house animals or birds cross the border.

Section II Access to Ports and Aboard Ships

Article 32. Access to ports located on the border and on the territorial sea of the Socialist Republic of Romania is permitted in compliance with the following rules:

- a) Worker personnel in the socialist units located in the precincts of the ports have access on the basis of the job identity card, with a photograph, signed by the head of the unit;
- b) Other categories of worker personnel who go for official purposes to ports have access on the basis of the identity document and the job order or the authorization signed by the head of the socialist unit to which they belong;
- c) Romanian and foreign seamen on ships moored in ports have access on the basis of the seaman's card. Foreign seamen must also possess the land-access permit;
- d) Persons who travel by ship for foreign voyages have access on the basis of the documents that permit them to leave the country, and those who go by ship for domestic voyages, on the basis of the identity document and the travel ticket;
- e) Means of transportation have access on the basis of the documents that will be established by the heads of the socialist units in the precincts of the ports, with the prior agreement of the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior and the commanders of the border-guard units.

Article 33. Access for the worker personnel of the socialist units, for official purposes, aboard ships under a foreign flag stationed in ports is permitted on the basis of an identity card, job order or authorization, signed by the head of the socialist unit at which they are employed.

The worker personnel who work permanently in ports have access aboard ships under a Romanian and foreign flag, at rest, on the basis of an identity card with a photograph, and the temporary worker personnel, on the basis of a list of names signed by the head of the port unit.

Article 34. The members of the diplomatic and consular corps, the trade representations' members with diplomatic status, and the representatives and functionaries of the international organizations found on the territory of the Socialist Republic of Romania, within the limits of the agreements regarding these organizations to which the Romanian state is a party, have access aboard merchant vessels stationed in ports on the basis of the identity card issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The technical, administrative and operating personnel within diplomatic missions, consular offices and trade representations have access aboard merchant vessels stationed in ports on the basis of the authorization issued on request, from case to case, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Article 35. Foreign specialists, technicians and merchants have access aboard ships under the flag of their own state or under the flag of other foreign states,

stationed in ports, on the basis of the approval given by the state administration's central bodies involved.

The personnel of foreign aerial- and naval-navigation agencies have access aboard ships under a foreign flag, other than that of the state for which they work, stationed in ports, on the basis of the approval given by the chief of the checkpoint for crossing the state border.

The personnel mentioned in the preceding paragraph have access aboard ships under the Romanian flag or that of the state for which they work, which stop in ports, on the basis of the permit for access aboard the ship, issued, at the request of the navigation agency, by the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications.

Foreign seamen have access aboard other ships under a foreign flag on the basis of the seaman's book or card and the land-access permit.

Article 36. Access for persons aboard ships under the Romanian flag, at rest or in motion, found in the border waters or on the territorial sea, is permitted by the ship's captain under the conditions established by the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications.

Access for persons aboard ships under the Romanian flag that come from foreign voyages is permitted by the ship's captain only after the performance of the border inspection. Access for persons aboard ships under the Romanian flag that leave on foreign voyages is forbidden after the performance of the border inspection.

When ships under the Romanian flag are moored in a double berth with a ship under a foreign flag, access is permitted by the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior at the checkpoints for crossing the state border.

Article 37. The central bodies of the state administration that give approvals for access aboard ships for foreign specialists, technicians and merchants and for the personnel of foreign aerial- and naval-navigation agencies will inform the Ministry of the Interior about this.

Article-38. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will inform the Ministry of the Interior about the identity cards issued for the members of the diplomatic and consular corps, the trade representations' members with diplomatic status, and the representatives and functionaries of the international organizations found on the territory of the Socialist Republic of Romania and about the access authorizations issued to the technical, administrative and operating personnel within diplomatic missions, consular offices and trade representations.

Article 39. Access to land for crews of ships under a foreign flag is permitted on the basis of the permits issued for this purpose, according to law.

Access to land for crews of ships under the Romanian flag is permitted by the ship's captain, in accordance with the provisions of the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications, after the performance of the border inspection for arrival and until the performance of the inspection for departure on a voyage.

In the ports of the Socialist Republic of Romania where there are no checkpoints for crossing the state border or border-guard units or subunits, access aboard ships for

persons and to land for foreign seamen is permitted by the bodies of the militia. In this case, on emergence upon land the bodies of the militia issue an access permit to the foreign seamen.

Article 40. The persons who hold management positions in the party and state apparatus mentioned in the appendix to the present decree, the officers, military masters and noncommissioned officers in the Ministry of the Interior, and the supervisory and navigation-control personnel in the Inspectorate for Civil Navigation and the subordinate units, found in the execution of official tasks, are excepted from the obligation to possess documents for access to ports and aboard ships.

Article 41. The norms established in the present section are also applicable to the Tulcea, Galati, Braila, Hirsova, Cernavoda and Calarasi ports.

Section III

Rules on the Performance of Activities on the Coast of the Black Sea and on the Territorial Sea of the Socialist Republic of Romania

Article 42. The provisions of Article 16, Paragraph 4, Article 17 and articles 21-30 are also applicable in the cases regarding the coast of the Black Sea or the territorial sea of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

Article 43. Sport fishing by boat in the territorial sea is permitted up to a distance of 4,000 meters from shore.

Article 44. The parking, mooring, stopping at anchor, and use of pleasure, sport, fishing and "Salvamar" craft are permitted with the approval of, and under the conditions established by, the commanders of the border-guard units.

Article 45. Tours with vessels and craft are made only in the Tomis, Constanta and Mangalia ports and at the points arranged specially for this purpose in the seaside resorts, with the approval of the commanders of the border-guard units and under the conditions established by them.

Article 46. The use of vessels and craft for the performance of measurements, hydraulic-engineering work, and research of any nature is permitted with the prior approval of the commanders of the border-guard units, requested at least 5 days in advance, and under the conditions established by them.

Article 47. Swimming by persons is allowed in the sectors of specially arranged beaches, marked with indicators and provided with "Salvamar" service.

Access to the open sea for persons, regardless of the means used, is permitted up to the limit marked and provided with buoys or other indicators, through the good offices of the executive committees or bureaus of the people's councils of the municipalities, cities and communes.

Section IV

Access to the Mangalia Military Port

Article 48. The guard and the entire activity in the Mangalia military port are organized by the Ministry of National Defense, Naval Command.

The delimitation of the Mangalia military port is established by means of a decree of the State Council.

Article 49. The access, navigation and stopping of civilian ships under the Romanian flag in the Mangalia military port, the old outer harbor and the connecting channel between the old outer harbor and Lake Mangalia, as well as at the southern dike of the old outer harbor, will be permitted with the approval of, and under the conditions that will be established by, the Ministry of National Defense, Naval Command.

For civilian ships under the Romanian flag that go to the Mangalia Shipyard, the approval of the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications, Department of Naval Transportation, is also necessary.

Article 50. Access for ships under a foreign flag to the Mangalia military port, the old outer harbor and the connecting channel between the old outer harbor and Lake Mangalia, as well as stopping at the southern dike of the old outer harbor, are permitted only with the approval of the minister of national defense. The prohibition of access and stopping by ships under a foreign flag will be communicated by the Ministry of National Defense, Naval Command, by means of notices for navigators.

Chapter V

Obligations that Devolve upon Socialist Units and Citizens

Article 51. The chairmen of the executive committees or bureaus of the people's councils and the heads of the socialist units located in the border zone and on the coast of the Black Sea are obligated to bring the provisions of the present decree to the cognizance of subordinate personnel and to take steps for compliance with them.

Article 52. Before hiring worker personnel, permanent or seasonal, living in localities located beyond the border zone and the coast of the Black Sea, the heads of the socialist units in the border zone and on the coast of the Black Sea are obligated to obtain the advice of the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior regarding them.

Article 53. Persons living in a locality in the border zone and on the coast of the Black Sea and those who come temporarily to a locality in the border zone and on the coast of the Black Sea are obligated to obey the rules established by means of the present decree and to submit to inspection by the border-guard bodies.

Chapter VI

Control and Supervision of the Application of Border Legislation

Article 54. In order to provide for compliance with the rules existing in the border zone and on the coast of the Black Sea, the border-guard bodies and those of the Ministry of the Interior will establish joint measures for applying the provisions of the present decree and will make periodic inspections in order to discover, identify and punish the persons who violate these rules. In addition, they will promptly inform each other about the way in which socialist units and physical persons comply with the provisions of the present decree.

Article 55. The local bodies of the militia will communicate immediately, but no later than 4 hours after registration, to the border-guard units and subunits the persons coming to localities located in the border zone, as well as the duration of their stay in the zone.

Article 56. The patrol routes of the bodies of the militia, to a depth of 2,000 meters from the borderline toward the interior, for the land border, and from the high-water mark, for the water border, as well as on the coast of the Black Sea, outside the buildable perimeter of the localities, will be established by mutual agreement with the commanders of the border-guard units or subunits.

Article 57. For strengthening the guard for the state border, the executive committees and bureaus of the people's councils and the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior will assist the border-guard units, establishing for this purpose tasks for the public watch in the communes and villages located in the border zone and those on the coast of the Black Sea.

Article 58. The ships and craft in the possession of the Ministry of the Interior will navigate in the border waters and on the territorial sea under the conditions that will be established by means of a joint order of the minister of national defense and the minister of the interior.

Chapter VII

The Establishment and Punishment of Contraventions to the Border System

Article 59. The violation of the provisions of the present decree constitutes contraventions, if the acts are not committed under such conditions that, according to criminal law, they are considered infractions, and is punished as follows:

a) The violation of the provisions of Article 10, Article 11, Article 13, Article 15, Article 23, Paragraph 3, Article 27, Article 32, Article 33, Article 34, Paragraph 2, Article 35, Article 36, Article 39, Article 47, Article 52 and Article 53, with a fine from 200 to 500 lei;

b) The violation of the provisions of Article 14, Article 16, Article 28, Article 30 and Article 45, with a fine from 300 to 600 lei;

c) The violation of the provisions of Article 24, Article 31, letters a and f-j, Article 43 and Article 44, with a fine from 400 to 800 lei;

d) The violation of the provisions of Article 18, Article 19, Article 20, Article 23 and Article 26, with a fine from 500 to 1,000 lei;

e) The violation of the provisions of Article 17, Article 21, Article 31, letters b-e, Article 46, Article 49 and Article 50, with a fine from 600 to 3,000 lei.

The establishment of the contraventions mentioned in the present article and the application of the penalties are done by the border-guard officers, military masters and noncommissioned officers, by the officers and noncommissioned at the checkpoints for crossing the state border and of the militia, and by the specially appointed officers of the Naval Command.

Article 60. The offenders can lodge a complaint against the report for establishing the contravention within 15 days after the communication of it.

The complaint is handled, as the case may be, by the commander of the border-guard unit, the chief of the militia in the county adjacent to the state border, or the commander of the naval unit.

If the establishment of the contravention and the application of the penalty were done by the persons indicated in Paragraph 2, the complaint is handled, as the case may be, by the commander of the border-guard troops, the chief of the General Inspectorate of the Militia, or the commander of the navy.

In the case of the contraventions for which the regulatory act provides a fine of over 1,000 lei, the complaint is handled by the court in whose territorial range the contravention was committed.

Article 61. The provisions of articles 59 and 60 are supplemented with the provisions contained in the law regarding the establishment and punishment of contraventions.

Chapter VIII Final and Transitional Provisions

Article 62. The land areas becoming available through the reduction of the strip of the border-guard troops from 25 meters to 20 meters will be transmitted to the socialist units, according to law.

Article 63. Decree No 200/1956 on the Border System, Decree No 165/1959 on the Organization of the Border Guard Troops, Article 5 referring to the stopping of foreign navigation in the Mangalia port in the zone contained between the coast, 43° 45' latitude, 45° 53' latitude and 28° 45' longitude in Decree No 39/1956 for the Regulation of the System of the Territorial Waters of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and any other provisions contrary to the present decree are repealed.

Note: Decree No 85/1957 on the Founding of the Support Groups of the Border Guards and Council of Ministers Decision No 1,999/1969 for the Establishment of Measures Regarding the System for Guarding the State Border of the Socialist Republic of Romania have been repealed in accordance with Article II of Decree No 61/1981.

12105
CSO: 2700/213

BRIEFS

DISMISSALS IN PODUJEVO--At a meeting on 11 May delegates in the Podujevo Opstina Assembly dismissed Salih Gashi and Skender Gashi, judges of the opstina magistrates court, because of weaknesses shown in work and moral-political unsuitability. Also, Jakup Mustafa, social public attorney, was dismissed from his position because of a lack of commitment and responsibility in carrying out his duties. Delegates named Shaban Ganiu, graduate jurist, to be judge of the Podujevo Opstina Court. The delegates also removed Aziz Dibrani from his function as director of social income and member of the executive council, since he was holding three positions, having a few days ago been elected head of the SAWP opstina conference. Sabit Popov was named as his replacement. [Text] [Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian 12 May 81 p 5]

SCHOOL DISMISSALS IN OBILIC--Delegates of the Chamber of Associated Labor and the Sociopolitical Chamber in the Pristina Opstina Assembly at a meeting on 11 May removed Ramadan Latifi, director of the "Nikola Tesla" technical school in Obilic, as well as his assistants, Hamit Berisha and Mirjana Stankovic; the advisory council of the school was also dissolved. Selajdin Shala was named new director, and Shaip Fazliu and Ilija Gjoric, new assistants. In explaining the application of disciplinary measures at the technical school, Nazmi Recica, member of the opstina assembly executive council, said that 150 students took part in earlier demonstrations, about 700 participated in demonstrations on 5 May, and all 1,600 boycotted classes where their teachers were teaching. Ismet Beka was imprisoned for hostile action. At a 12 May meeting teachers and self-management organs at this school were sharply criticized because they did not take measures against the students early enough or recognize the hostile irredentist character of the demonstrations, since 80 teachers, or one-half of the faculty at this school, are members of the LC. Delegates did not accept the declarations by Besim Shehu and Spase Tanaskovic, representatives of the workers at the school, who said that the situation at the school was now satisfactory and measures did not need to be taken. [Excerpt] [Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian 12 May 81 p 5]

ISTOK PARTY MEMBERS OUSTED--At a meeting on 11 May of the LC Istok Opstina Committee it was reported that the enemy went to Istok the evening before 1 May to organize counterrevolutionary demonstrations, above all, because of inadequate vigilance and responsibility of the LC there. However, sociopolitical and self-management organizations, the delegate assembly, public security organs, and school centers also bear responsibility for escalation of the hostilities. This is very clear when it is known that there were indications before that the enemy would act,

but nevertheless measures were not taken, and preparatory actions in the LC and in SAWP branches did not produce the results expected. It was stressed during the 9-hour meeting that much stronger action is now needed against those responsible for nationalism, chauvinism, and hostile action. Nine persons were expelled from the LC for participating in demonstrations or disseminating disinformation; five teachers were also suspended, and the basic organization of the LC in the village of Kovrage was dissolved. [Excerpt] [Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian 12 May 81 p 5]

CSO: 2100

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

2 June 1981